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ABSTRACT 
Territorial and border disputes have long been a foundation for conflicts in the 
international arena, but in Latin America, gaps in literature still remain. Analyzing cases 
in this region can equip the international community to understand sources of conflict, 
formulate improved foreign policy with U.S. allied partners, and achieve steps toward 
peace and stability. The general application theory is still being sought: What factors 
cause dispute resolutions in Latin America? 
Chile has been able to resolve disputes with other countries with shared borders 
but has yet to yield to Bolivia’s aspirations for sovereign access to the sea. This thesis 
examines three case studies of territorial or boundary disputes utilizing Chile as the 
nexus: the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and Argentina; the Chile-Peru 
Maritime Boundary Dispute; and Bolivia’s pursuit of sovereign access to the Pacific 
Ocean. Through analysis of dyadic attempts at resolution via an international relations 
lens, this research finds that nations in dispute are likely to terminate conflict with the 
presence of an international resolution body, a desired mutual peace, and leaders that 
promote favorable discourse toward settlement. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In recent decades, dispute resolutions in Latin America have shown that rivalry 
and rapprochement have impacted international relations for the better. For example, 
Chile and Argentina signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1984, resolving an 
enduring dispute over the Beagle Channel.1 Since then, they have profited from regional 
trade and democratic peace. In 2014, Chile and Peru achieved results for their maritime 
dispute from the ICJ; the settlement opened more opportunities for developing closer ties 
and expanding integration. As Chile has successfully resolved two border disputes, one 
wonders why Chile and Bolivia are still distanced.2 For over a century, Chile has refused 
to yield to Bolivia’s salient aspirations for sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Chile 
has settled disputes with its other neighboring states, and yet, the major obstacle Bolivia 
seeks to overcome fails to resonate.  
What factors cause resolution of border disputes in Latin America? This thesis 
investigates what factors likely drive states in choosing to settle territorial or border 
disputes. Widespread and often enduring, territorial disputes the world over have 
escalated to interstate war; however, in the last two hundred years, a number of states 
have peacefully settled disputes through use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
bilateral negotiations, or arbitration.3 The rewards to resolving these disputes are many, 
including economic exchange, mutual defense cooperation, and diplomatic relations. To 
find out why some states resolve disputes and why others do not, I examine three Latin 
American dyads that have engaged in territorial disputes, and attempt to seek out a 
general application theory that might explain what factors matter in the resolution 
process. 
                                                 
1 James L. Garrett, “The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern 
Cone,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no. 3 (1985), 81, DOI:10.2307/165601. 
2 Edgardo Manero, “Strategic Representations, Territory and Border Areas: Latin America and Global 
Disorder,” Geopolitics 12, no. 1 (2007), 11, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00233006/document. 




Territorial disputes have long been a foundation for conflicts in the international 
arena—land claims have essentially been the root of all other types of conflicts because 
they tend to create ripples of tension. By identifying the logic used by states involved in 
disputes, we may be able to achieve steps toward peace and stability. Analyzing cases in 
the Americas—an area with relatively little research—should be a routine and necessary 
tenet in securing our understanding of “our shared home,” a term emphasized by former 
commander of U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Jim Stavridis.4 Dispute resolution 
research is valuable for military and foreign policy formulation in the United States, 
academic advancement, and the changing role of international institutions. 
First, the commander of United States Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) 
holds building partner nation capacity within the South American region top priority. 
Through the process of establishing and maintaining relationships to ensure national 
security, our military relies on continued engagement and cooperation with our allies.5 
The United States shares many values with Chile, including stances on human rights, 
promotion of democracy, and pursuance of strong economic policies. Studying how Chile 
resolves or does not resolve its border disputes bears relevance on our U.S. military and 
diplomatic interests, and, more generally, holds relevance among any international 
partner relationship. 
Second, there are not enough literatures outside of the subject area of Europe 
address the topic of territorial disputes and its eventual lead up to crises and war.6 In the 
Asian and Latin American region, more territorial disputes exist, yet gaps in research 
remain.7 By examining special cases in South America and applying existing theoretical 
                                                 
4 James Stavridis, Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern 
Command (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2010): xvii. 
5 United States Southern Command, “Commander’s Priorities,” Defense.gov, accessed November 16, 
2015, http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/ Commander’s-Priorities.aspx. 
6 Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict, (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), accessed October 16, 2015, 6, 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/Doc?id=10327048. 
7 Wiegand, Territorial Disputes, 90–91.  
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perspectives, we, as an academic community focused on policy, can sharpen our 
understanding of state behaviors regarding enduring disputes elsewhere. 
Lastly, educating ourselves on the conditions that enable border conflicts may 
help us to understand how to de-escalate them. While the majority prefers to maintain 
diplomatic solutions in a time where full-scale war is now rare, the potential for negative 
economic and political impact is greater with the existence of unresolved boundary and 
territorial disputes. Paying attention to these challenges and their causes may better equip 
the international community to understand sources of conflict and formulate improved 
foreign policy. 
Given the importance of this question, I expect that additional research in this 
field will contribute to an increasingly important collection of literature. Chapter II 
focuses on exploring what has already been addressed about territorial disputes through 
different schools of international relations (IR) theory. In this next section, I present my 
plan of action for analyzing the research question. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines and compares three case studies. Each dyad includes a 
territorial or border dispute that generated one or more resolution attempts, which, in this 
thesis, are categorized as dependent variables (DV).   
The countries examined in each of these dyadic cases (Chile–Peru, Chile–
Argentina, and Chile–Bolivia) follow the “most similar” research method. Likewise, all 
of the dyads are similar; they represent regional rivalries and border issues while 
controlling for colonial and religious history.8 At the very core, each dyad has resulted in 
war with each other and consists of Spanish-speaking democracies that were former 
Spanish colonies. Additionally, I selected these dyads because they have shared a range 
of disagreements unrelated to political borders as well. While attempting to create a 
perfect “most-similar research design,” it is important to note that it is barely possible to 
                                                 
8 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework (Boston: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 210. 
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find a “near perfect” design in the real world.9 Through the “most-similar method,” each 
case (territorial or border dispute) tests each hypothesis on dichotomous variables using 
“more subtle differences of degree.” While each differs in outcome (resolved dispute 
versus unresolved dispute), each variable represents an absent or present similarity, 
which will help assess what factors and characteristics of each dyad lead to resolution.10   
Chile, which currently remains the most stable country in the region, was selected 
as the nexus in this analysis to allow for more control and depth throughout the thesis 
structure. The other countries represented vary along the fields of human development 
index, globalization, competitiveness, and the like. These differences help explain the 
logic behind decisions of territory and border resolution; namely, the impact that being 
landlocked might have on winning an appeal for disputed land and maritime access.   
I have chosen a categorization scheme based on Western international relations 
theory and its three most common schools of thought—realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism. The categorization scheme provides a streamline of thought and aligns 
the analysis for sake of organization of the thesis. Implicitly, levels of analysis are used 
whenever possible by virtue of my research, primarily through second image (that of the 
state); however, if possible, first and third image may be applied. 
In this thesis, I examine political border disputes in the Chile–Argentina and 
Chile–Peru dyads, while the Chile–Bolivian dyad, involving an irredentist claim, 
capitalizes on discussions of previous guarantees that hint toward bilateral negotiations 
(see Figure 1). I also research the types of bilateral agreements these dyadic relationships 
attained in order to be considered a dispute resolution. Argentina and Peru signed 
multiple treaties and protocols in regard to their specific challenges; however, few issues 
in question still remain (e.g., a section in the Patagonian ice field that remains unmapped 
due to varying geography).11 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Border Disputes: A Global Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: 
Abc-Clio Incorporated, 2015), 450. 
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The research takes into account all published information until the end of 2015. 
The sources I use for analysis are primarily sources from the Western Hemisphere in 
English and Spanish. To provide nationalist views, this research includes perspectives 
from country-sourced articles, blogs, source documents, and books. This thesis attempts 
to answer the more general causes for dispute question but primarily concentrates on this 
particular South American region. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The following chapter focuses on the three main theoretical perspectives of 
international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) as applied to boundary 
disputes. Chapter III discusses the first case study, the Beagle Channel conflict between 
Chile and Argentina. This chapter highlights one of the earlier boundary resolutions made 
with Chile during both environments of military and democratic governments. Then, the 
case study on Peru and Chile’s maritime border conflict is discussed in Chapter IV. 
Although this studies a maritime border dispute, Peru’s involvement is important in 
context to the Bolivia question, as they both had lost valuable land to Chile in the 19th 
century. Chapter V focuses on challenges from Bolivia that involve multiple issues of 
desiring maritime access or negotiating over lost territory that once connected to the 
Pacific Ocean. I intend to apply the approaches and principles gained from each 
preceding chapter to establish an expectation regarding the outcome of the Bolivian plea 
for maritime access. The conclusion, where I make an overall supposition of the Bolivia-
Chile boundary dispute, ties the research together. Through these case studies, I may be 
able to provide an answer to the question of border disputes that may be applied to 
conflicts in not only the South American region but elsewhere. 
 6 
 
Figure 1.  Location of Dyads in South America12 
  
                                                 
12 Adapted from World Atlas, last modified July 12, 2016, 
http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/sa.htm. 
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II. MAIN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Four in Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution is titled Reinvindicatión Marítima 
(“Seacoast”), which declares its inalienable right of the territory that once gave them 
access to the Pacific Ocean, referring to the lost Antofagasta region, which they lost to 
Chile in the War of the Pacific.13 Bolivia thus challenged Chile on an irredentist claim—a 
movement intended to reclaim and reoccupy a lost homeland—that is symbolic, as well 
as economically valuable, to the landlocked country. The dispute has since been taken to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). If we consider the 1904 treaty, which was agreed 
upon and signed by both parties (according to President Evo Morales in 2013 and 
effectively imposed on Bolivia “down the barrel of a gun”), it is uncertain that this plea is 
a legitimate claim.14 Few works provide insight to Chile’s obstinate attitudes toward 
dealing with Bolivia on this issue. Although the literature focuses on historical aspects of 
territorial and boundary disputes armed conflict between dyads it does not analyze the 
factors and conditions resolutions surrounding them.15   
Those who have examined this field scholarship and provide answers to the 
research question have provided numerous factors that align with certain interstate 
relationships. I endeavor to explore these probable answers, which generally fall into 
three schools of IR theory. For this analysis, the potential hypotheses are presented and 
grouped by the realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches. 
 
                                                 
13 Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (2009) (Constitution of Bolivia): ch. IV, 
art. I, accessed December 12, 2015, 
http://www.presidencia.gob.bo/documentos/publicaciones/constitucion.pdf. 
14 Gideon Long, “Bolivia-Chile Land Dispute Has Deep Roots,” BBC News, April 24, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22287222. 
15 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 18. 
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B. REALISM 
1. Literature Review  
A number of authors argue that exploiting disputed territory as bargaining 
leverage in concession talks is the reason why disputes endure. Krista E. Wiegand 
believes that target states may purposely maintain disputes toward negotiations over other 
unresolved issues in the future. Using a dual strategy of issue linkage—taking into 
account the matters of politics, economics, and diplomacy—”states can benefit from the 
endurance of a territorial dispute, and therefore they will pursue dispute strategies that 
best meet their ability to achieve bargaining gains with other disputed issues.”16   
Jorge I. Dominguez et al. make a similar argument that supports an overall 
strategy of coercive bargaining in which a state will choose militarization of a dispute as 
a tactic to negotiate. The incentive to militarize becomes a state’s bargaining tool; it will 
cause other states to intervene, thereby reducing the cost of its aggression and creating a 
moral hazard—the “risk for further escalation is low” because other states will 
interfere.17 
While not as fervent as Wiegand, David R. Mares looks at a past Argentina-Chile 
dispute involving the Beagle Channel dispute and militarized bargaining as a model. 
According to Mares, “Policymakers usually negotiate without any recourse to military 
force,” but the use of military strengths can influence the terms greatly.18 Mares draws 
upon Argentina’s weak bargaining position for one or more islands off the Beagle 
Channel at the southern tip of South America. Like Dominguez, Mares points out that 
militarized bargaining costs play a factor for escalation, as in the case with this conflict. 
In his example, Argentina needed to figure out how to broaden Chile’s bargaining range 
in order to keep them out of the Atlantic.19 Additionally, Mares examines hypotheses that 
                                                 
16 Wiegand, Territorial Disputes, 43. 
17 Jorge I. Dominguez et al., “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” United States Institute of Peace 
(Purdue: Purdue University, 2003): 27, accessed October 9, 2015, https://www.usip.org 
/sites/default/files/pwks50.pdf. 
18 David R. Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), 8. 
19 Ibid., 138. 
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ask whether power preponderance within a dyad, not parity, affects whether or not two 
states go to war or peace over a dispute.20  
Bolivia’s irredentist claim of natural resources lost from the War of the Pacific is 
a “paradigm not only of the relationship between conflict and sovereignty on resources 
but also of the return of secessionism, irredentism and annexationism.”21 Edgardo 
Manero draws upon the resurgence of Latin American conflicts attributed to 
controversies regarding control of flows—legal commodities like oil and minerals, as 
well as illegal goods like drugs. Even more than just a traditional territorial claim, the 
issue centers on a demand for sovereignty from a landlocked country resourced in non-
renewable resources.  
2. Hypothesis 
The realist approach believes that states—relative to their neighbors—strive to seek 
power to increase their national power or to remain competitive within a system of 
anarchy. Given that realist theory suggests that strong states involved in territorial disputes 
are more likely to choose increasing their capacity for defense and as a form of power 
projection, the target state (in this example, Chile) may choose not give into Bolivia’s 
request. The theory also leads to the belief that states are unlikely to concede territory if 
they already maintain an advantage or wish to maintain the status quo. A country like Chile 
may refuse to risk territory in order to maintain the status quo; however, once that status is 
lessened or compromised, bargaining leverage is no longer a question.  For any other 
salient issues that result afterward, the target state (i.e., Chile, in this case) may not be 
capable of gaining the upper hand.  I believe Chile will maintain the resource-rich area 
until a new resource becomes attractive enough to the target that it has potential to boost 
its own economic influence and power.  In this respect, I hypothesize that 
HR1: If a target state perceives that giving up bargaining leverage through 
concessions of territory will not threaten its national security or lose its 
status quo as a power, a resolution is more likely to take 
place.  Conversely, if a target state perceives that giving up bargaining 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 115. 
21 Manero, “Strategic Representations,” 30. 
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leverage through concessions of territory will threaten its national security 
or its status quo, this will decrease the likelihood of resolution.  
C. LIBERALISM 
1. Literature Review 
Political leaders who choose to endure border or territorial disputes may do so 
because of the implications of domestic policy. This school of thought posits that leaders 
are likely to turn to arbitration or implore the use of third-party arbitration when they are 
afraid to make decisions on their own.22  According to Paul K. Huth, the lack of incentive 
to seek a dispute resolution exists because territorial concessions are perceived as a 
foreign policy defeat.23  Huth and Todd Allee claim that leaders who “anticipate 
significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions 
are likely to seek the ‘political cover’ of an international legal ruling.”24  Legal dispute 
resolution is more likely if the issue is greatly salient to domestic audiences; to be able to 
justify the making of concessions, Huth and Allee argue that the authority should be 
mandated as “part of a ruling by an international court or arbitration body.”25 By the 
same grain, the authors have developed this theoretical model that may be applied to 
other legal disputes.26   
In another work, Huth and Allee say that realist critics fail to make a compelling 
logical case that domestic-level variables should not be expected to shape the foreign 
policy choices of state leaders.”27 Their theoretical analysis for democratic peace, in 
which “domestic political institutions and norms of behavior can influence state policy in 
international disputes,” is plausible.28 They define their collective analysis as a modified 
                                                 
22 Kenneth Schultz, “Borders, Conflict, and Trade,” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 
136, accessed October 20, 2015, DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-020614-095002.  
23 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 184. 
24 Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth, “Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as 
Domestic Political Cover,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 2 (2006): 219. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 232. 
27 Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16. 
28 Ibid. 
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realist approach that finds leaders concurrently managing their tenure and positional 
power with their national security interests overseas. 
Mares discusses a view consistent with the democratic peace theory, which claims 
that “democratic polities ‘rarely wage war on one another’”; the promotion of democracy 
will increase the level of international security among neighboring states—namely, two 
democracies.29 States of the Western Hemisphere are assured in this belief, and just in 
case, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution in which “a threat 
to democracy in any Western hemisphere nation automatically constituted a threat to the 
security of all American nations.”30 With regard to the Argentina-Chile conflict dispute, 
Mares argues Argentinian leaders were faced with balancing avoiding military conflict 
with its Chilean neighbor and the commitment to the bi-oceanic principle, which he 
called a “public good.”31 Losing control over a public good would redefine itself relative 
to Chile; its effect on domestic policy would result in a loss of control in the territorial 
dispute. 
Another solution to territorial and border disputes can be as easy as taking it to a 
third party, such as International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague for ruling. The 
Economist published a piece of work that exposed a “grown-up way to settle a long-
standing border dispute” between Peru and Chile.32 Peru took its case for maritime 
dispute to the ICJ, which gave a challenger state an opportunity to benefit economically 
from an international actor. Following the verdict, an act of war was not pursued; on the 
contrary, what resulted was a shared outlook to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties 
between the two states. If Chile and Peru are able to cooperate under the world stage to 
maintain its maritime boundaries, their story may be an example to other states that are 
currently under pressure to concede to contestants—this is “how one boundary is redrawn 
                                                 
29 Mares, Violent Peace, 84. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 139. 
32 “A Line in the Sea: Here’s a Grown-up Way to Settle a Long-Standing Border Dispute,” The 
Economist, February 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21595481-heres-grown-up-way-
settle-long-standing-border-dispute-line-sea. 
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could end up affecting other maps, too.”33 It is Bolivia’s hope that by following Peru’s 
lead, the ICJ may fix their wounds. Of note, the majority of ICJ cases that already have 
an existing treaty that demarcates a set boundary—much like Bolivia and Chile—will 
revert to the judgment stated in the treaty. Territorial claims of the “treaty” category, as in 
Bolivia’s case, are easier to assert due to its existence of documentation, rather than the 
existence of customary international law or general principles of law.34  
2. Hypotheses 
In regard to the liberal democratic peace theory, democratic norms and 
institutions are more likely to encourage neighbors to negotiate a dispute and avoid 
military conflict.35 These shared norms and institutions are complementary causes for 
states to refrain from acting aggressively and instead toward maintaining a sort of peace. 
Similarly, the assertion that free trade influences international relations could potentially 
mean success for Bolivia. In contrast to realist theory, the liberal school of holds that 
interdependence may be an option to preserve peace between neighbors and act as a 
benefit to both economies. Therefore, I hypothesize that 
HL1 If both states perceive that maintaining the status of democratic peace, 
mutual cooperation, and reciprocal interdependence is more beneficial 
than costly, the likelihood of resolution increases. Conversely, if both 
states perceive that maintaining the status of democratic peace, mutual 
cooperation, and reciprocal interdependence is more costly than beneficial, 
then the likelihood of a border dispute resolution decreases. 
The case for sovereign access to the sea was brought to the International Court of 
Justice at The Hague, Netherlands, for ruling. In 2008, Chile had been challenged by Peru 
regarding a dispute for its maritime border. As the challenger, Peru enacted third-party 
arbitration that finally resulted in a delimitation of the maritime boundary in early 2014. 
Where fishing practices and trade played factors, the dispute was of great importance to 
both countries where a boundary had not been agreed on before. By following the third-
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Brian Taylor Sumner, “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice,” Duke Law Journal 
53 (2004), 1781, accessed December 12, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040452. 
35 Huth and Allee, Democratic Peace, 6. 
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party intervention model exhibited by Peru, similar results may happen in the case of 
Bolivia. This is the following hypothesis:  
HL2: If there is an international resolution body present, then a resolution 
is more likely to take place. Conversely, if there is no international 
resolution body, the likelihood of a border dispute resolution decreases. 
D. CONSTRUCTIVISM 
1. Literature Review 
A few Latin America countries continue to carry on disputes stemming from 
lingering colonial issues. Edgardo Manero explores different takes on strategic 
representations in the region by arguing that an ideology of conquest led to what we now 
view as Latin American geopolitics.36 He argues that Chilean traditional nationalism has 
been a factor worth noting in Bolivia’s desire to regain access to the sea. The 
impoverished nation of Bolivia continues to struggle without a territory involving 
“resources, whether ‘real’ or ‘imagined.’”37 Although this is a factor, he writes that the 
anti-Chile feeling should also be looked at in more detail “in the context of the resistance 
to the depredation of national resources, which are exploited by transnational firms”; the 
Bolivian movement for access is not only fighting for the principles against natural 
resource exports but demonstrating “a refusal of the detrimental conditions of natural 
resource negotiations that have damaged the Bolivian state and its citizens.”38  
Marcus Kornprobst addresses how irredentist disputes in Europe were peacefully 
resolved using what he calls “dejustification.”39 He argues that those who brought down 
the justification for the territorial dispute did so by changing the ideology surrounding the 
claim. Social construction of the geopolitics in a region gives way to the dynamics in the 
disputes; an “identity narrative” constructs the borders.40 Kornprobst claims there are two 
                                                 
36 Manero, “Strategic Representations,” 23. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 31. 
39 Marcus Kornprobst, Irredentism in European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise and Norms 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 228. 
40 Ibid. 
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levels of social construction that are important to dispute settlement: deep level and 
adjustment level. The deep level is how the borders are imagined, and is completely 
ingrained in the identity narrative. A nation defines itself by which it “distinguishes 
between those inside and those outside of the nation.”41 The adjustment level, by 
contrast, regards “how nations invent and reinvent the quality of their borders within 
these parameters.”42 While he claims that coming to a peaceful resolution solely on 
changing the deep level is difficult, changes to the adjustment level can lead to peaceful 
resolution, and even friendship, citing the Republic of Ireland as an example. If 
justification regarding the legitimacy of borders can unravel, then nations can withdraw 
their irredentist claim—de-justification.43  
2. Hypothesis 
Concerning ideologies, states may choose to address disputes depending on its 
fluctuations in leadership. Different administrations are capable of prompting strong 
discourse to promote feelings of nationalism and ownership of territory while others can 
lessen the emphasis of a particular border issue in order to reduce its importance to the 
state. Strands of constructivist theory believe that the “capacity of discourse [can] shape 
how political actors define themselves and their interests, and therefore modify its 
behavior.”44  The end of the Cold war can be attributed to the collective decision of the 
leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States; while this argument gives agency in 
individuals, it can apply to these case studies. Actors who had political impact were able 
to change the behaviors of the state—in the form of policy, patriotic and national 
discourse, and the like. The nation’s expectations derived from their behaviors, therefore 
reshaping state identity. The constructivist school cannot predict why countries choose to 
solve a dispute or the nature of the conduct between the involved parties, but it offers the 
notion that change is possible. With that being said, 
                                                 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., 229. 
43 Ibid., 229. 
44 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 
(1998): 41, accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275. 
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HC1: If it is within the agenda of political leadership to promote discourse 
in favor of a resolution, a resolution is more likely to take place. 
Conversely, if it is within the agenda of political leadership to promote 
discourse against border dispute resolution, then a resolution is less likely 
to take place.  
In the 21st century, most states have been established for quite some time—
territories have been drawn and set and connected technologically, economically, and 
politically for many years. The increasing interdependence between nations in all regions 
becomes not only complicated, but transcends to the complex. The goal of this thesis is to 
explore which of these eight hypotheses about whether a target country chooses to 
continue or resolve a territorial or border dispute appears to hold, and in what potential 
combinations. Perhaps it is not as simple as saying one reason or another is the main 
factor for settling a dispute—it may be more intricate as that; however, I think that a few 
reasons are stronger than others and the task is to find out what those reasons are. 
E. METHOD OF CODING 
Each case study will present resolution attempts (dependent variable) that relate to 
the dispute subject matter. At the end of each chapter sub-section, a summary table will 
list whether each IR-based hypothesis, the independent variables (IV) is a factor in the 
outcome (Yes or No). Indicated in the final column of each period’s summary table, the 
outcome of each resolution attempt, or dependent variable (DV), is numerically coded. 
The DV is coded according to the strength of agreement between the two parties; 
outcomes are evaluated on a 4-point scale, measuring two types of partial resolution:  
 1 = no resolution: no parties agree on the terms of resolution 
 2 = partial resolution: one of the parties agree to the terms of resolution 
 3 = partial resolution: both parties agree on terms of resolution, not ratified 
 4 = resolution: both parties agree to terms of resolution; ratified, complied 
to terms  
The IR-based hypotheses are evaluated against each attempt, with the majority of 
documented endeavors in this chapter reflecting at least a partial resolution.  
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F. PREDICTIONS  
Based on my research, I predict that the pattern exhibited by Latin American 
countries involved in these types of conflicts will choose and rely on arbitration. Over 20 
cases in Latin America have been resolved through some form of arbitration; in contrast, 
countries outside the American continent still amount to the single digits.45 Although it 
can depend on the norms of the government, most democratic-leaning countries are 
willing to comply with decisions made by organizations within the system to which they 
also belong.   
In an era where the likelihood of militarized conflict wanes, the likelihood that 
nations will come together depends on the realization of economic integration and 
cooperation among them. It may be beneficial to make compromises in order to attain 
this level of stability. In a salient issue such as the sovereign access to the sea, Bolivia 
needs to be willing to concede as well as its target state. 
In addition to these theories, I also predict that the “magic button” that pushes 
disputes to settlement depends on the support of the nation’s leadership. Regardless of 
government type, people in positions of power also have the power of persuasion; 
therefore, governing bodies have the ability to influence outcomes when they 
demonstrate commitment toward a decision. 
   
                                                 
45 Beth A. Simmons, “Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and 
Territorial Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 6 (December 2002): 836, DOI: 
10.1177/002200202237931. 
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III. CHILE–ARGENTINA DYAD  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III examines the first of three disputes discussed in this thesis: the Beagle 
Channel dispute, one of the most long-lasting boundary disputes between Argentina and 
Chile. Since the enactment of the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Chile and 
Argentina have institutionalized cooperation and interdependence.46  Multilateral forums 
such as Mercosur and the OAS have benefitted both countries in economic integration, 
creating shared interests.47   
To determine what conditions or factors might bring two states of a territorial 
dispute to the negotiating table, I examine the process that led to the Beagle Channel 
dispute’s final resolution. To explain this, Chapter III intends to achieve three things. 
First, this chapter discusses the historical background of the dispute between the two 
major states, and the border conflict that arose out of the late 19th century. Second, this 
chapter studies each arbitration attempt since its first border-related agreement in 1881. 
The resolution attempts examined in this dyad are the 1881 Boundary Treaty of Limits; 
the 1893 Protocol between Chile and Argentina; the 1902 General Treaty of Arbitration; 
the Protocols of 1915, 1915, and 1960; the 1977 Arbitral Award; and the conclusive 1984 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Third, this chapter explores how each resolution attempt 
reached an outcome, drawing from the three schools of IR theory discussed in the 
previous chapter. Each section concludes with an application of four hypotheses, 
alongside the DV as the outcome of the resolution itself. Through this process, I provide 
a better understanding of what factors might lead a major power like Chile to choose a 
path to resolution over a path of an enduring dispute—as is in the case with Bolivia’s 
aspiration for sovereign access to the sea.   
 
                                                 
46 Randall R. Parish, Jr., “Democrats, Dictators, and Cooperation: The Transformation of Argentine-
Chilean Relations,” Latin American Politics & Society 48, no.1 (April 2006), 143, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111/j.1548-2456.2006.tb00341.x. 
47 Ibid., 167. 
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B. BACKGROUND OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE 
The Beagle Channel dispute lasted almost a century as one of the earliest conflicts 
between Argentina and Chile since their independence. They share one of the longest 
borders in the world to include the communal Andes Mountains, which makes territorial 
control challenging. The rendering of the informal uti possidetis juris in 1810, a guiding 
principle that provided newly independent sovereign states to retain the same borders that 
their preceding regions held prior to independence, established the boundary beginnings 
within Latin America.48 Prior to the 1881 Boundary Treaty, the first of a long series of 
border resolution attempts, conflicting claims by both countries in the Andean and 
southern regions already existed in the 1840s.49 Unfortunately, due to other urgent 
matters at the time, the friction that existed regarding claims in the southern uninhabited 
territories would take a backseat. 
The source of the Beagle Channel dispute—named after the natural water 
boundary in the southern region—originated from the dual claims of inherited lands by 
both Argentina and Chile.50 Argentina achieved independence in 1816 and Chile in 1818. 
After the Spaniards had colonized and left the region, the two countries discovered their 
inheritance of overlapping parts of the Patagonia—the region shared by the two nations 
in the Southern Cone. Due to their economic importance and strategic location along the 
Beagle Channel (see Figure 2), the islands of Picton, Nueva, and Lennox (affectionately 
known as the “PLN group”) stand at the heart of this controversy.51 
                                                 
48 Garrett, “Dispute,” 86. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Lisa Lindsley, “The Beagle Channel Settlement: Vatican Mediation Resolves a Century-Old 
Dispute,” A Journal of Church and State 29 (Fall 1987): 435. 
51 Garrett, “Dispute,” 82. 
 19 
 
Figure 2.  The Chilean and Argentine Interpretations of the Beagle Channel Path 
around the Islands of Picton, Nueva, and Lennox52 
After the signing of the 1881 treaty, which failed to address the specific confines 
of the Beagle Channel, both Chile and Argentina unsuspectingly claimed sovereignty 
over the critical body of water.53 Since 1884, Argentina operated a military base in 
Ushuaia Bay, on Tierra del Fuego, moving many of its ships through the channel and 
around the PLN islands. Unconnectedly, Chile had been providing land to settlers ever 
since 1892. Altogether, this occurred without any communication between the two 
neighbors.54 In 1894, Argentina objected the colonies Chile had granted to settlers on 
Nueva and Picton; unsuccessful in resolution, Chile stubbornly made a formal claim on 
the islands.55   
A part of the dispute generated within Article III of the 1881 Treaty, which 
assigned all land and islands south of the Beagle Channel to Chile. Without the types of 
reliable maps to validate the borders outlined in the terms, Chilean and Argentine claims 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 83. 




were both interpreted differently (see Figure 3). This drew major scrutiny, considering 
the significance of the islands’ location to unexplored Antarctica. An incomplete picture 
would render the uti possidetis juris ineffective and give additional cause to head toward 
territorial conflict.56   
Consequently, the major questions surrounding the issues were, “Did Argentine 
sovereignty stop at the water’s edge in the channel?” and the other, “Which path did the 
Beagle Channel follow in its eastern mouth?”57 The answers to these questions decided 
whether Argentina would have access to its Ushuaia military base via the channel. 
Overall, the country that ultimately won possession of one, two, or all three of the 
contested islands would determine the state of maritime control and access to a 
potentially valuable area. 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 86. 
57 Mares, Violent Peace, 133. 
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Figure 3.  Argentine Views of the 1881 Boundary Treaty, Maps Drawn 
According to Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration58 
Originally regarded solely for its extremely cold temperatures and lack of 
contribution to wealth, possession of the PLN group remained low in priority to either 
country during the initial stages of demarcation.59 At the time of the Treaty of 1881, 
maritime law allowed coastal states the rights to a three-mile shelf.60 This rule changed in 
the mid-1940s when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
established a 12-mile territorial limit and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).61  
58 “Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration,” Wikipedia.org, accessed April 27, 2015,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=4677595. 




The creation of this rule further complicated the unresolved case, as ownership of the 
PLN group became further blurred and required stricter lines of territorial distinction. The 
islands’ total size averages to approximately 40 square miles of area; however, with the 
200-mile EEZ in place, custody over the group would extend control to over an 
additional 30,000 square maritime miles.62 Aside from these changes in maritime 
jurisdiction, the later discovery of petroleum and fish in the area would sweeten the 
deal.63 Once aware of the potential of petroleum, the strategic and economic worth of the 
South Atlantic would move from trivial to extremely valuable for both Argentina and 
Chile.64 The appealing Beagle Channel region would expand the shelf area for either 
nation, promote further exploration in the Antarctic region, and increase wealth and 
power. 
C. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES—ATTEMPTS AT RESOLUTION 
1. Resolution Attempt: 1881 Boundary Treaty 
In return for its neutral role in the War of the Pacific, Chile recognized 
Argentina’s sovereignty over Patagonia through the Boundary Treaty of 1881.65 Also 
known as the Irigoyen-Echevarria Treaty, it was named after the Foreign Affairs Minister 
Bernardo de Irigoyen from Argentina and Don Francisco de B. Echeverria from Chile.66  
The Treaty formed the initial foundation of boundary limits at a time when border 
problems began to increase friction between both countries. Though both Argentina and 
Chile had long maintained possession of the area from the Rio Negro and southward, the 
border areas north of the Beagle Channel (the Puno area of the Andes region) forced the 
neighbors to the brink of conflict.67 Multiple incidents occurring in the Straits of 
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Magellan and with foreign ships, such as the Chilean seizure of the Jeanne Amelie, a 
French vessel (despite permission from the Argentines to be in those waters68), propelled 
the governments to pause and take advantage of the assistance offered by local U.S. 
representatives.69 As a result, the newly minted Treaty specified the terms agreed to by 
both: all islands east of Tierra del Fuego belonged to Argentina; islands west of Tierra del 
Fuego, as well as those situated south of the Beagle Channel and north of Cape Horn, 
belonged to Chile.70  Regrettably, the definition as “south” and the exact Beagle Channel 
limits were ambiguously addressed.71 
Furthermore, the Treaty also provided a foundation for the concept of 
bioceanismo, or the bi-oceanic principle.72 Designed to define a peaceful co-existence 
between both South American nations, it obscurely assigned Chile to watch over the 
Pacific and Argentina in the Atlantic.73 As an addition to the Treaty of 1881, the 1893 
Protocol endeavored to clarify certain parts of the parent document; inconveniently, the 
Protocol was ratified without any accompanying maps.74 According to Argentina, the 
Treaty and its supporting protocols denoted the enforcement of the bi-oceanic principle.75  
The part of the Protocol relevant to bioceanismo came from Article II: 
According to the spirit of the Boundary Treaty, the Argentine Republic 
retains its dominion and sovereignty over all the territory extending to the 
east of the main range of the Andes and as far as the Atlantic Coast, and 
the Republic of Chile the territory west as far as the Pacific Coast; it being 
understood that, by the provisions of that Treaty, the sovereignty of each 
State over the respective littoral is absolute so that Chile cannot claim any 
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point towards the Atlantic nor can the Argentine Republic claim any point 
towards the Pacific.76 
a. Key Takeaways from 1881 Boundary Treaty 
Absent from the Treaty of 1881 was the reference to the islands south of Tierra 
del Fuego. The Treaty’s two notable articles, II and III, addressed the immediate border 
concerns, but failed in creating a sharper picture. Article I appeared to be the least 
ambiguous in its address of the boundary’s end found at the 52nd parallel. The setback 
found in the Article dealt with its postponement of responsibility relating to future 
watershed divide concerns: If, in the future, uncertainties emerged after this Treaty 
issuance, the matter “shall be amicably solved by two Experts, one appointed by each 
party.”77 Moreover, the Article mentioned that if the two Experts failed to agree, an 
outside party—selected by both Argentina and Chile—shall be called in to decide among 
them.78 At the Treaty’s conclusion, a catch-all phrase puts future matters into the hands 
of an external resolution body: “any question which may unhappily arise between the two 
countries . . . shall be submitted to the decision of a friendly Power.”79 
To encourage passing of the resolution, Chilean officials urged their leadership to 
press with approval in order to avoid unexpected disruptions to the pending Bolivia-Peru 
peace treaty.80 Chileans believed relinquishing Patagonian lands would not damage any 
vital interests, and, at that point, they possessed nothing on the sparse areas while 
Argentina did.81 In addition, Argentine leadership fostered support of this treaty. In the 
name of bioceanismo, Irigoyen appealed to the Congress, proclaiming “that the treaty 
meant that the Argentine flag would be ‘the only one that will fly . . . from the Rio Negro 
to the Strait and Cape Horn.’”82 
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b. Application of Hypotheses 
This initial resolution attempt illustrated the states’ need to provide a clear 
delineation of territory, but was not indicative of the realist approach. At this early stage 
of bilateral geopolitics, mutually acknowledged borderlines did not exist between the two 
states. The realist argument (HR1) relies on the value that states place on giving up 
bargaining leverage through concessions. Whereas the spirit of the 1881 Treaty solely 
addressed the border information gap, it never implied alteration of the status quo. Both 
countries’ sovereign claims over the contested area clearly revealed their perception of 
territory as valuable, but the realist approach cannot explain the outcome of the 
agreement. Though Chile’s reasoning for the resolution prompt could be traced to the 
general use of territory or bodies of water as instruments of power, its circumstances with 
Bolivia and Peru at the time seemingly mattered more. 
The first liberal argument (HL1) can explain the outcome, given the treaty’s intent 
to peaceably establish spheres of influence for each state. The states’ plan to draft a treaty 
of boundary limits rather than engage in conflict demonstrated a determination to 
maintain a sort of democratic peace. Bioceanismo, a cooperative and respectful principle, 
was most evident in the decision to divide the Tierra del Fuego and Andes range down 
the center.83 “Desirous of terminating in a friendly and dignified manner the boundary 
controversy,” there was a deep recognition to resolve disagreements peacefully.84 I argue 
that this treaty set the initial conditions—via amicable and cooperative approaches—for 
future conferences.  
My second hypothesis based on the liberal theory (HL2) cannot explain this 
outcome given that the Treaty referenced use of decision-makers within the governments 
rather than external to the region. Although the Treaty was devised with a pathway 
allowing third party involvement, it does not meet the criteria of utilizing an international 
resolution body for adjudication. The treaty laid out the foundation for territorial 
consensus with the stipulation that any forthcoming cases may be decided by another 
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commissioned group of administrators, rather than spelling out a more permanent 
demarcation; these “experts” would be designated by each government. 
Examination through the constructivist lens indicates that prompting strong 
discourse in favor of resolution explains the attempt’s positive outcome. In Chile, 
officials appealed to heads of government in respect to the resolution’s importance and 
championed its approval; by doing so, they reasoned, the potential for unwanted political 
disruptions would be eliminated. The constructivist argument (HC1) can account for this 
outcome, given that the leadership had direct impact on the sway of 1881 Treaty’s 
approval.  
In summary, the 1881 Boundary Treaty can be described through the liberal and 
constructivist theories (see Table 1). Irigoyen and Echeverria signed the treaties in favor 
of a peaceful border resolution rather than conflict, eliminating the notion that the 
political leaders desired discourse against a settlement. Both parties settled on a contract 
that remained unchallenged until the 1900s, when further clarification was necessary for 
the Andes Mountains and Isla Grande lines of demarcation.  
Table 1.   Hypotheses Application to 1881 Boundary Treaty 



















No Yes No Yes 4 
 
2. Resolution Attempt: 1893 Protocol  
As discussed, the Protocol came into being to further clarify the boundaries in the 
Cordillera de los Andes, regarding disputed claims in the Andean mountain range.85  
Argentina objected to an incorrectly placed boundary marker that designated a portion of 
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the Puna de Atacama region to Chile; Argentina fervently rejected this notion.86 
Originally, the naming convention was based on a belief that geographical boundaries 
from crest to crest followed the same suit as the water-parting line.87 Once again, the 
zone in question only addressed to the extent of the 52nd parallel.88 Since the 1881 
Treaty, Argentina and Chile had slowly established settlements in the southern region 
along the Beagle Channel without much resistance, since odds of skirmishes in this vast 
area were less likely. For example, in the early 1880s, English Protestant settlers were the 
first to occupy the area now called Ushuaia; in 1884, the Argentines established a 
military base there.89  Chile also began to establish regional settlements, such as Puerto 
Pabellón in 1892.90 Nevertheless, the Patagonian claims and northern borders were 
central to these early treaties, regardless of the events occurring in the maritime sphere. 
Like the 1881 Treaty, the 1893 Protocol was ratified without accompanying maps; 
however, according to Argentina, it was the first time the bi-oceanic principle was 
embedded in a dispute resolution. The statements materialized in Article II (see Section 
B, “Background”), based on the uti possidetis juris principle from 1810. Although the 
majority of the Chileans publicly rejected Argentina’s request to remove the marker, 
envoys from both governments came together to eagerly negotiate with diplomacy than 
with military might.91 
a. Key Takeaways from 1893 Protocol 
The Protocol accomplished three things. First, it set to supplement the Boundary 
Treaty by expounding upon the questionable terms of the Boundary Treaty. To validate 
that the Protocol was nothing more than amplification of the parent document, Article X 
noted that the “preceding stipulations do not impair in the very least the spirit of the 
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Boundary Treaty.”92 The failure to comprehensively recognize the gaps in both the 
Treaty and Protocol eventually led to the source of the Beagle Channel controversy. At 
the time, however, these decisions solved the issues close at hand and simultaneously 
released Chile from having to sort out complications with Argentina during the War of 
the Pacific.93   
Second, the Protocol continued its inclusion of “Experts” to provide a ruling over 
questionable water-divides—where boundary lines could be demarcated on the ground 
with the assistance of Assistant Engineers. These entities would solve cases “foreseen in 
the second part of Article I of the Treaty of 1881,” in the event the geographical features 
of the Cordillera change.94 Article V of the Protocol placed deadlines on the Assistant 
Engineers of this project to complete ground demarcation—again not establishing 
permanency on boundaries through the document, but via actions forthcoming.95   
Third, it housed the language Argentina would later reference regarding 
bioceanismo. Vehemently maintained by the Argentines, the bi-oceanic principle had 
been a constant underlying issue. Moreover, an Argentine atlas drafted up in 1891 made 
light of this viewpoint, but was disregarded in the Protocol of 1893. Unfortunately, the 
Protocol missed another chance to address the problems of the Beagle Channel and the 
PLN group, an issue that remained dormant until the early 1960s.   
b. Application of Hypotheses 
Given that the nature of this protocol was a supplement of the 1881 Boundary 
Treaty without implications of amending the status quo, HR1 can be ruled out in this 
period. Argentina and Chile arrived at a resolution with the potential to concede or 
redraw borderlines. Although it does not deliberately define the principle of bioceanismo, 
it certainly is implied from in the text of Article II of the 1881 treaty that both countries 
agreed upon: ”the sovereignty . . . over the respective coastline is absolute . . . Chile 
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cannot lay claim to any point towards the Atlantic, just as the Argentine Republic can lay 
no claim toward any toward the Pacific.”96 I argue that consent of this “bi-oceanic” 
principle demonstrated acknowledgement of the boundaries. The trust put into the 
Protocol also reaffirmed that the issue was not considered high-risk to their national 
defense. Chile was the target state in this case, and consented to the terms for further 
demarcation. 
Bearing in mind the message of peaceful order in the Protocol preamble, the first 
liberal argument can explain the outcome of the attempt. Consistent with the Treaty, the 
Protocol continues to call on “experts” to preside over questionable circumstances; I 
assume that these statements are written to maintain a non-violent method of resolution. 
By wishing to “establish . . . a complete and sincere accord corresponding to their 
antecedents of confraternity and common glory,” it is perceived that both countries 
viewed mutual cooperation as South American neighbors as beneficial.    
Similar to the terms specified in the parent Treaty, adjudication options continue 
to be handpicked within the region. Given this fact, the second liberal approach—
regarding international resolution parties—cannot account for the successful outcome. 
Both governments opted to select decision makers internal to their own people. The 
utilization of internal judges alludes to the relationship’s considerably low level of 
prevailing tension. At this point, the argument can be ruled out, but the contingency to 
select multinational adjudicators will begin to find relevance in the years ahead. 
Each country’s public sphere revolved around the boundary negotiations. 
Attitudes were aggravated by newspaper media, which could “serve to misguide public 
opinion.”97 Through concerted efforts to conciliate the fascination of the public, both 
Argentine and Chilean boundary experts and their protocol negotiators agreed to keep the 
terms private until its approval. By delaying the notification of the Protocol’s conditions, 
the leadership gained control over releasing information and subsequently, control over 
the outcome. Given that both parties worked together to promote discourse in favor of the 
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policy, the constructivist argument also explains this period. Rather than negative 
discourse leading to a non-resolution, the opposite occurred.  
The 1893 Protocol, like the Boundary Treaty, can be described through the liberal 
and constructivist theories (see Table 2). In addition to the precedent set in 1883, political 
leadership played a role in directing the public sentiment toward settlement of the dispute. 




















1893 Protocol No Yes No Yes 4 
 
3. Resolution Attempt: 1902 General Treaty of Arbitration 
(Compromiso) 
Continuing the quest to consolidate peace and improve bilateral relations, the 
1902 arbitration acted to resolve differences and territorial disputes still in question. 
Initiated by Chile’s desire to reach a comprehensive settlement, bilateral negotiations in 
Santiago resulted in the Pactos de Mayo, a body of work establishing much of the present 
day Chile-Argentina border.98 All boundary-related questions had been submitted to “a 
friendly Power” for decision since the 1881 and 1893 agreements.99  The 1902 General 
Treaty (comprised of the Pactos de Mayo) became the first to establish the precedent in 
assigning an international authority to settle their regional disputes; the dyad nominated 
King Edward VII of the United Kingdom (U.K.) as the final arbitrator.100  
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a. Key Takeaways from Treaty 
Like its antecedent, the 1902 Compromiso (as the agreement was also called) 
communicated the intent to amicably resolve disputes by way of a named arbiter.101  The 
preamble illustrates the countries’ “mutual desire of solving, by friendly means, any 
question,” describing the treaty to be broad in all matters, “whatever nature they may 
be.”102 Article III of the Compromiso specifically stated that His Britannic Majesty’s 
Government was named as the main arbitrator.103 As a backup, a mediator would be 
named from the Swiss Confederation in the event that either Chile or Argentina severs 
relations with the U.K.104  
The resolution did not succeed in tackling the developing issues in the Beagle 
Channel region. Communication was difficult in these larger areas, and the protocols 
could only address areas in dispute at the time. Although the results of the Award solved 
four disputed areas along the frontier, the totality of protocols did not specifically resolve 
matters of the Beagle Channel and Laguno del Desierto (see Figure 4).105 After Britain 
determined the outcome, another year would pass until the “experts” mentioned in the 
Protocol would even begin to tackle the Beagle Channel issue.106  
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Figure 4.  Results of the 1902 Treaty Delimitation Awarded by King Edward VII 
of the United Kingdom107 
Alternatively, these arbitration treaties managed to cool tensions between the 
Argentina and Chile, two stockpiling players involved in a Southern Cone arms race.108 
Though the Beagle Channel would not be settled by this particular agreement, a 
significant part of the Treaty included a binding agreement that limited naval armaments 
for both powers. To limit the opportunity for armed conflict, the convention signed in 




and from making any new ones.109  Having economic interests in both states, the British 
encouraged this statute.110 Additionally, this clause appeared to be a manifestation of the 
bi-oceanic principle that Argentina still claimed and Chile repudiated; it intended to 
maintain an “equivalence of disarmaments” for Chile in the Pacific and Argentina in the 
Atlantic.111   
b. Application of Hypotheses
Chile’s wartime proficiency from its most recent experience in the War of the 
Pacific built up a substantial amount of weight in territory. Chile had annexed a large 
amount of territory from Peru and perhaps viewed these Argentine border disputes as a 
relatively lesser risk.112 Nevertheless, Chile agreed to equalize naval disarmament and 
concede according to the monarch’s decision. Given that Chile showed a willingness to 
give up any leverage upon agreement of British mediation, the realist argument can be 
ruled out here.    
The Compromiso promoted a huge wave of respect between the countries, 
producing multiple mutual guarantees of diplomacy. The treaty did three main things: it 
bound both countries to submit inquiries to an external party; it excluded all previously 
decided questions from future arbitration; and it communicated a reciprocal stance on 
naval de-armament.113 Encompassing these types of well-intentioned clauses, the first 
liberal argument can explain the outcome of the attempt. Committed to resolve its border 
disputes and repair broken relations, Argentina and Chile both deemed it mutually 
beneficial (rather than costly) to sign the arbitration treaty.    
The international resolution body personified in the British monarch debuted in 
this arbitration, certainly accounting for the second liberal argument. The British award 
that succeeded the agreement did not shadow either Chile’s water-parting line or 
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Argentina’s highest peak theory from the previous treaty, but rather was drawn at an 
intermediary point.114 Although this approach triggered protests from either side, both 
parties eventually agreed to move forward with arbitral demarcation.115 The decision of 
an arbiter—along with the Compromiso’s clause permitting invocation of other arbiters—
led to a deal and set the precedent for external parties in the future.  
In this section, the constructivist approach is ruled out since there is not sufficient 
evidence or research that can demonstrate a strong case of political leadership 
involvement. As in the previous arbitration attempts, Argentina and Chile arrived at a 
resolution by employing means of diplomatic peace and the use of external parties (see 
Table 3). 
In whole, the entire premise of the arbitration was to ensure both sides remained 
on equal footing regarding matters of territory, security, and defense—without erupting 
in war. In this attempt at arbitration, the Compromiso was instrumental in repairing faulty 
borders in the four areas named by the treaty; unfortunately, much of the south remained 
unexplored at a time when the PLN group seemed strategically unimportant.   
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4. Protocols from 1915, 1938, and 1960
Following the 1902 General Treaty of Arbitration, exploration continued in the 
Southern Cone during the next fifty years with disregard to the Beagle Channel and the 




War I, the Beagle Channel became important enough to bring Chile and Argentina to the 
table once again.116  Chile’s claim on the islands of Picton and Nueva, the easternmost 
islands south of the Channel, prompted a request from Argentina to jointly resolve the 
Beagle Channel axis to refrain from potential military dispute.117 Chile agreed to pursue 
the effort, but not according to the terms set forth by Argentina.118 To reconcile these 
disputes, multiple protocols between 1915 and 1960 attempted to address independent 
regional incidents that occurred after the 1902 Compromiso. Within these bilateral 
negotiations, they sought solutions for arbitration, and eventually, a dispute resolution; 
unfortunately, in every attempt, the protocols failed to attain ratification—a partial 
resolution. This section summarizes the main points in each Protocol and examines each 
outcome against my hypotheses thereafter.  
a. 1915 Protocol for Arbitration between Chile and the Argentine Republic
To address Chile’s claim on the PLN group and to avoid further territorial 
misinterpretations, the Chilean and Argentine governments established a protocol in June 
1915. Their respective plenipotentiaries agreed to submit the Beagle Channel controversy 
to an established precedent from the 1902 Treaty—His Britannic Majesty.119 This 
protocol was the first to mention Lennox, the southwestern-most island of the PLN 
group.120 The Protocol’s single Article determined which of High Contracting Parties 
would sign the treaty, as well as defined the arbitrator’s duty of formulating the rules for 
adjudication.121 The senates of both countries approved the deal, while “their respective 
House of Representatives did not;” consequently, the protocol was never ratified.122   
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b. 1938 Protocol for Arbitration between Chile and Argentina
The second attempt in the post-Compromiso period took place in May 1938 with 
the intent of resolving “the only remaining controversy.”123 Continuing peaceful relations 
as states of “international brotherhood,” both governments agreed on choosing an 
arbitrator from the United States to weigh in on the Beagle Channel dispute.124 Before 
the matter fully materialized, the arbiter, Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, 
unexpectedly died. As a result, the endeavor stagnated. As if following a pattern, the 
protocol was also drawn up but never reached ratification by either party.125 
c. 1960 Protocol for Arbitration between Chile and the Argentine Republic
Sparked by a dangerous incident that happened in the Beagle Channel, Argentina 
and Chile came together to negotiate once again. In 1958, conflict nearly ensued over 
Snipe Isle (Figure 5), an unoccupied islet located northeast of Navarino Island and 
positioned approximately equidistant from the Channel’s shorelines.126 Both countries 
had declared the island as possessions, and going back and forth between lighthouse 
destruction and construction (as a way to stake its claim).127 Since any operation reports 
in this area suffered delay in reaching the seat of government, the militaries were on the 
verge of conflict before the presidents were able to avert the incident.128   
In a third attempt to discuss a resolution dispute since the Compromiso, Argentina 
and Chile drafted a protocol for arbitration in June 1960. Argentina conditionally agreed 
that Lennox and adjacent islets would be under Chilean sovereignty, while the two 
Becasses Islands—located directly east of Snipe—would belong to Argentina.129 In 
particular, the Protocol declared that the manner in which this reciprocal recognition 
transpired “does not imply in any way the intention to indicate a criterion to the 
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International Court of Justice,” the chosen arbiter for the rest of the territorial disputes.130 
Chile’s Congress found Argentina’s offer of Lennox Island to be unfavorable, since the 
reciprocal terms would leave Chile with less navigational latitude in the channel.131 
Hence, this matter remained unresolved as a result of the countries’ legislatures 
withholding their mandate, leaving the 1960 protocol unratified.132 
Figure 5.  Snipe Islet of Beagle Channel133 
5. Application of Hypotheses
These protocols were built upon the inconclusiveness of the previous protocol. 
Sharing many similarities in analysis, they are analyzed in this section as one large 
episode. Indications of territorial concessions were unknown in the first two protocols, so 
the realist approach cannot explain their outcomes. Given the dyad’s indecision in 
matters related to sovereignty (which were exposed mostly in the culmination of the 
Snipe Incident and 1960 rejection of the Lennox-Becasses exchange), the realist 
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argument helps in revealing their preferences for territory. The protocol, however, 
resulted in a partial resolution—with both parties in agreement—indicating the 
incongruence of HR1 in this 1960 attempt as well.  
At each protocol, the Argentine and Chilean governments invariably emphasized 
peaceful negotiations, which take into account the first liberal approach. By this point in 
history, the importance of conflicting claims grew significantly due to a multitude of 
factors: Ushuaia developed and attracted more people to the southern area, Antarctica 
drew increased international curiosity, and more resources were discovered in Tierra del 
Fuego in the mid-20th century.134 Considering both states continued dispute resolution in 
a civilized manner despite tensions, HL1 still drove them to attempt a decision. Although 
these resulted in partial resolutions, the intent found in the statements exuded a desire to 
eliminate “grounds for misunderstandings” that may get in the way of strengthening their 
friendship.135 
The trend for international body resolutions continues to prove the second liberal 
approach as a mainstay. Despite the mediators Argentina and Chile had nominated (the 
British monarch was selected in 1915, the American attorney general in 1938, and the ICJ 
at The Hague in 1960) never got a chance to provide their services, they still played key 
roles of the attempts at arbitration.  
Given that there is no specific data showing domestic politics played a part in 
influencing the protocols, HC1 is ruled out. Decisions by both Argentina and Chile were 
hampered by congressional leadership; however, I suspect that the decision to reject 
ratification in 1960 was linked to the increasing aspirations for the PLN island group—
and ultimately, the surrounding waters.   
The 1915, 1938, and 1960 Protocols were unable to meet their aims (see Table 4). 
All three protocols were political whims, demonstrating both governments’ 
ineffectiveness in reaching an agreement on the contested Beagle Channel area. These 
deficiencies led to more difficulty as external military and territorial tensions continued to 
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rise in the 1970s and 1980s. All of these unratified documents can be explained through 
the liberal IR hypotheses. Moreover, they show the sliver of willingness for both 
countries to settle the longtime dispute, rather than to endure it.  
Table 4.   Hypotheses Application to the 1915, 1938, and 1960 Protocols 

















1915 Protocol No Yes Yes No 3 
1938 Protocol No Yes Yes No 3 
1960 Protocol No Yes Yes No 3 
 
6. 1977 Resolution Attempt 
The events prefacing the 1977 Arbitral Award was influenced by a series of 
domestic and international dynamics that evolved from the general Cold War atmosphere 
of territorial stability.136 The outcome of this period’s attempt was decided by third 
parties, which resulted unfavorably for Argentina. David Struthers argues this period 
“was a failure” because instead of resolving the Beagle Channel dispute, it made matters 
worse by ignoring the need for political solution.137 
a. Discussions Preceding the 1971 Arbitration Agreement 
In 1964, both countries signed a joint statement to present the case to the ICJ, 
which aligned with the intention of the Protocol in 1960 and patterned external 
adjudication.138 During the process of arbitration, Chile acted unilaterally and stated its 
intent to take the dispute to the United Kingdom for a decision, citing the 1902 Protocol 
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terms.139 Dumbfounded, Argentina suspended further negotiations.140 Even more, the 
British crown refused to arbitrate with the consent of both countries.141  
In 1969, the Argentine National Security Council tried rekindling talks to resolve 
due to its national importance.142 Given Chile’s refusal to negotiate directly, Argentina 
accepted to submit to arbitration under a compromise that allowed for both the ICJ and 
British Crown to participate.143 Under the compromise, the ICJ would decide the case 
merits presented and send the result to the Queen; Her Majesty would not be able to 
modify the decision, but only reject or accept the decision.144 This was not the first time 
that the U.K. had a role in Argentine-Chilean disputes; however, the political tensions 
regarding the Malvinas would have made acceptance of an award that favored Chile 
rather difficult.145 Despite this, Argentina agreed only if the document primarily ran 
through international law and that all were clear in what exactly needed to be resolved—
the definition of the Beagle Channel boundary and which nation would claim sovereignty 
over Picton, Lennox, and Nueva.146   
b. 1971 Agreement for Arbitration (Compromiso) 
The formal Agreement for Arbitration, signed in July 1971, assigned five judges 
to the ICJ court (from the U.S., U.K., France, Nigeria, and Sweden) to ready the results 
for the Queen.147 The zone submitted for arbitration was dubbed the “Hammer,” a six-
point area that included the PLN group.148 The nations’ cases for sovereignty included 
three pleadings submitted by each party, supplemented with written testimony and oral 
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proceedings.149 Bioceanismo and the uti possidetis juris clause, rooted in the 1881 
Treaty, dominated Argentina’s cases in theme.150 On the other hand, Chile alleged that 
the Channel’s eastern mouth opened up between Isla Grande and the PLN group, thus, all 
islands south of that Channel belonged to them.151 Chile also claimed that the “Atlantic” 
described in the Treaty was not in reference to bioceanismo, but rather to the islands on 
the Atlantic.152   
The Argentine president, General Alejandro Lanusse, wanted to promote regional 
integration with its neighbor—and navigation rights would need to be more transparent 
for that to occur.153 In this arbitration, he expected to retain at least one island (Lennox, 
the most easternmost) assuming bioceanismo.154 Though the arbitration process endured 
for almost six years, the submittal to arbitration demonstrated that both still were capable 
of overcoming their differences, despite the existing uncertainty pertaining to the 
acceptance of terms.155  
c. 1977 Arbitral Award 
The Court found that the PLN group stood south of the controversial Beagle 
Channel; subsequently, all three islands were awarded to Chile in February of 1977.156  
Argentina was shocked by the Court’s decision, as it had always believed it would at least 
receive one or two of the three islands—not lose all three.157 The Court did not agree that 
bioceanismo was sound enough reason to interpret the 1881 Treaty, which was primarily 
based on specific geographical features.158 Furthermore, the Court found that awarding 
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maritime boundaries was outside their jurisdiction and should be resolved bilaterally;159  
this was in response to Argentina seeking bilateral negotiations with Chile concerning the 
zone’s maritime environment.160   
(1) Key Outcomes of Award 
After the decision was issued, ratified, and accepted by the Queen, Chile quickly 
acknowledged the decision and claimed a 200-mile EEZ extended in a southeastern 
direction from the mouth of the Beagle Channel.161 Argentina adamantly believed that 
the jurisdiction should follow the maritime law used in the 1881 Treaty of Boundary 
Limits—a three-mile limit rather than a 200-mile EEZ.162 Struthers argues that this 
decision constituted “a failure by the Court and the Arbitrating Party [U.K] to realize the 
need to address this case not only from a legal perspective, but also from a political 
one.”163   
The outcome fulfilled Argentina’s concern. By claiming sovereignty to the PLN 
group, Chile could potentially draw a boundary line southward into the ocean and 
potentially access Antarctica, posing a “threat to resource exploitation and 
movement.”164 With all previous arbitrations supporting the Chilean perspective, it is 
possible that Argentine leadership sensed their position was threatened in both regional 
influence and rights to potential wealth.165 Consequently, Argentina—under military 
President Jorge Rafael Videla—withheld approval of the decision, and nine months after, 
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issued a Declaration of Nullity.166 Although Argentina came to the negotiating table, its 
disagreement with the result ranked higher than compliance with international norms.167 
(2) Application of Hypotheses 
It is possible to view Argentina’s rejection as a blow to national prestige; 
however, it is conceivable that they reject the fact they are now bound from access to 
vital resources.168 Lanusse believed Argentina would acquire at least one island, but 
instead left empty-handed. Acquiring a considerable amount of access to the ocean, 
Chile’s new-fangled prizes elevated its status. Given that both states submitted the case to 
an outside party while understanding the risk involved showed that the realist approach 
cannot explain the outcome. 
Additionally, Chile was not at a considerable military advantage; both were 
refraining from military conflict, and Argentina still attempted to resolve the issue 
diplomatically. Given that Argentina was still convinced that peaceful order was 
beneficial overall—regardless of the global context—HL1 can help explain its preference 
for coming to the table. The research also intimates that General Lanusse promoted his 
reasons to resolve in the name of regional integration with Chile, where HL1 might also 
apply.   
Regardless of Argentina’s annulment of the Award, it still had agreed to allow 
two international resolution bodies to partake in the dispute. In this case, voiding the 
Queen’s decision was possibly due in part to the political factor (developing tensions 
with the British over another set of islands), so HL2 cannot be ruled out to explain this 
resolution. In both the Award and the 1971 Agreement, a persistent willingness remained 
among both parties to continue mediation for the sake of international diplomacy.   
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The decision seemed to have caused agitation between governments, especially 
among Argentina, since military nationalism grew in significance during this time.169 
Author James L. Garrett states, “With government approval, if not direction, the 
Argentine press reported . . . its government’s hardline position.”170 The constructivist 
argument can help to explain the outcome given that the Argentine press influenced the 
public to support the rejection because it threatened “national honor,” which people 
favored to agree.171 The effect of the government on its constituents via the press lent 
itself to prove that discourse played a huge part in the partial resolution (see Table 5).   
For an internationally-determined resolution to work, it must be in the self-
interests of both parties involved. Argentina’s decision to deny the ICJ’s decision can be 
equivalent to the failure of following through with last step of ratification. Both parties 
understood there was inherent risk in including third parties for dispute resolution, so for 
them to reach a mutual agreement also involves inherent trust in the process, to include 
the choice of mediator. 
Table 5.   Hypotheses Application to 1977 Arbitral Award 
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7. 1984 Resolution Attempt 
The 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship took place under the divine guidance of 
the Vatican. This final resolution came after many years of bilateral negotiations and in 
total, a century of controversy. The pathway to mediation was close by, but not without 
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protests and a few failed measures. Of these, the most notable Acts happened in 1978–
1979, leading up to the Papal mediation. 
a. 1978 Act of Puerto Montt 
In 1978, both Presidents Videla of Argentina and Augusto Pinochet of Chile met 
in Puerto Montt, Chile, keen on finding a solution. Although frustrated, they decided that 
negotiations would be pursued bilaterally, rather than third party mediation, and they 
would do so via a series of three commissions.172 Signed on February 20, the 1978 Act 
specified that the commissions addressed at least the following: the major issues of the 
southern zone delimitation; courses of action to promote peaceful physical integration 
and economic development; and questions on policy coordination in Antarctica and the 
Straits of Magellan.173 
While it was in the best interest of both leaders to reach an agreement through 
established commissions, the goal was never realized. The first commission was not as 
successful as hoped. Here, the governments were to define the issues and propose a way 
ahead; instead, it ended inconclusively just as the second commission began talks.174 The 
maritime jurisdiction debates frustrated both parties, impacting progress on the second 
commission.175 By this time, Pope John Paul II had inserted himself into the matter by 
offering his services to mediate; however, the countries declined as the commissions 
were in progress.176 
b. 1979 Act of Montevideo 
The 1979 meeting of the nation’s presidents in Montevideo helped to establish the 
path to the final resolution in the Beagle Channel Dispute, setting off a chain of 
discussions attempting to solve the maritime and territorial issues of their region. At this 
point, both governments were consumed by military rule. Ideologies of national pride 
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played a role in both countries and complicated their diplomatic relations.177 Nationalism 
was more robust in Argentina as it was the path chosen to compensate for its “weak legal 
basis.”178 In addition to the Beagle Channel, other claims such as the Malvinas and 
Antarctica were thrown into the stakes to make the matter more significant.179 To bolster 
their plea for territory, the Argentine government shepherded an unsuccessful anti-Chile 
media campaign to build public support of Beagle Channel claims; this led to 
mobilization of both militaries.180  
Despite Argentina’s overall “weak bargaining position,” Mares argues the nation 
turned to military force to signify its stance on the issue and to “broaden Chile’s 
bargaining range.”181 Chile responded by attempting to invoke the Rio Pact, a 
“hemispheric defense” treaty that stipulates that an attack against one country is an attack 
against all.182 Argentina chose to seize the islands and declare war; both naval squadrons 
came as close as 20 nautical miles before adverse weather postponed the attack long 
enough for the Vatican to offer its services of mediation.183   
The Vatican sent Cardinal Antonio Samore, the Pope’s envoy, to offer a solution 
other than military force.184 With plenty of international mediation experience and an 
admirable reputation to boot, the Pope was decided as arbitrator in an effort to keep the 
issue pacific.185 Using the shared Catholic religion as a reason to bond the two countries 
under a fair trial, Argentina and Chile signed the Act of Montevideo on January 9, 1979, 
agreeing to let the Holy See mediate the dispute regarding the southern region (initially 
challenged by Argentina) and also to refrain from force.186   
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c. 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Papal Mediation) 
In 1980, Pope John Paul II personally made a proposal accepting his role as 
mediator for the Beagle Channel dispute, stressing the fact that it was unique war had 
never existed between the two neighbors.187 He ensured they recognized their connection 
by language, faith, and religion—and they should strive to never lose that quality.188   
The two countries were prone to take their time during negotiations, so the Pope 
requested that they respond to the proposal in mid-January 1981.189 The proposal 
suggested that the maritime limit only extend to 10 miles instead of 200, and between 
miles 12 and 200 would be designated a “zone of shared resources” or “sea of peace.”190  
Chile reacted with confident reply, although Pinochet had said the proposal was “not 
fully satisfactory.”191 Argentina neither rejected nor accepted the proposal; however, 
after Raul Alfonsín was elected into the Argentine Presidency in 1983, he promised the 
Beagle Channel dispute would be his top foreign policy priority and vowed to 
acknowledge the bi-oceanic principle in further negotiations.192 By reversing old-
fashioned Argentine rhetoric, Alfonsín became the “impetus” in achieving an agreement 
with Chile.193 Unlike his predecessors, he was confident that negotiating would not 
necessarily mean a “loss of honor” for the nation.194 Pinochet also recognized that 
opposing the dispute further would continue to isolate his nation economically; economic 
integration with Argentina would provide a better option for Chile.195 
Dragging their feet, the Vatican pushed to proceed with talks. The Malvinas 
conflict with the U.K. seemed to distract Argentina from making negotiations, but 
according to repeated reports, when the parties came to the table, they approached talks 
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with optimism and much interest to settle.196 Both governments anticipated opposition 
from the public, so they agreed on a setting the treaty to a vote no less than thirty days 
from its release (a solution suggested by Alfonsín).197 In response to the “consultation” 
vote, both Chileans and Argentines had mixed reactions; some Argentines felt trapped 
between having to choose between “peace and war,” while some Chileans saw the 
resolution was “too generous.”198 Both presidents had given speeches and endorsed the 
agreement as a solution to achieving a sound fiscal system and peace between nations.199   
For Argentina, especially, Alfonsín needed to make a case to his constituents that 
basic security concerns would continue to be protected.200 A resolution would free up 
efforts to concentrate on something bigger: the Malvinas Islands;201 settling the conflict 
sooner would keep the Argentine military from fighting two fronts.202 Since over 70 
percent of qualified voters participated, the treaty was ultimately accepted and both 
nations acknowledged the concessions and compromise made by each other.203 
(1) Key Outcomes of the Treaty 
The Beagle Channel dispute was settled. The 1984 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship was signed, outlining the necessity for peace and friendship among the 
neighbors, the defined maritime boundary, and the call for a Binational Commission to 
strengthen economic development and integration.204  Chile and Argentina decided on a 
three-mile legal limit from the islands in the area, with all other countries abiding by the 
200-mile limit.205 The resolution was “transactional” because both parties ceded 
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something of interest.206 Also, the process was very significant in the history of public 
diplomacy, in that the new boundary line recognized Chile’s sovereignty of the PLN 
island group while respecting the principle of bioceanismo in the southern waters.207  
(2) Application of Hypotheses 
Given the fact that both nations agreed regardless of the fact that these 
concessions risked a change in status quo, the realist argument cannot explain this 
outcome of resolution. In this case, Chile was in a strong bargaining position yet accepted 
the Treaty’s terms in order to settle for peaceful relations (see Table 6). Additionally, 
during the Act of Montevideo, there was strong evidence of the two military powers 
refraining from surrendering territory. In spite of the fact Chile would possibly lose an 
island once committed to papal mediation, Pinochet signed the agreement. Chile was 
recognized as a South American power, maintaining the status quo; yet, by choosing to 
comply with the Act de-escalated military tensions. Chile’s decision to push forward 
contradicted the realist approach that asserts Chile would refrain from agreeing to resolve 
otherwise. Argentina also conceded in the interest of peace, its administration willing to 
promote the Treaty to preserve security and establish healthier economic relations.  
Through the papal proposal, the two states agreed to halt military conflict and 
progress toward a peaceful stance. Given that they used the Catholic Church as a conduit 
for mutual cooperation, HL1 can explain the outcome. During the strains of military rule 
and the events that played out in and around Argentina, there had been endeavors to rally 
toward war; however, though Argentina’s actions leaned toward ensuing conflict, both 
the Act of Montevideo and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship specified an obligation 
“not to resort to force in their mutual relations.”208   
Clearly, the acceptance of the Vatican as arbitrator is a preferred choice between 
Chile and Argentina. The capacity of Pope John Paul II as an impartial entity (and his 
ability to contribute sticking power) demonstrates the strength of adherence to the Treaty. 
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Given the fact both countries view this authority as unbiased, fair, and a reason to come 
to the table, the second liberal argument continues to describe this final outcome.   
My findings indicated that leadership communicated to their people the 
importance of the settlement, especially since the terms impacted both governments. The 
persuasions of both Pinochet and Alfonsín were crucial in ensuring the resolution would 
be well-received by their people. Given that the leaders understood the stakes and were 
able to convey that the nation would not diminish national pride as a result, HC1 can help 
in explaining the result. Discourse drove the resolution in a positive manner, proclaiming 
that elements such as security and nationalism were not going to be threatened. 
This final Treaty is presently still in effect (Figure 6), helping to bolster peace in 
the region and increase long lasting beneficial and mutual cooperation. The resolution 
was elucidated by both liberal approaches and the powerful use of discourse to reach its 
ultimate settlement. 
Table 6.   Hypotheses Application to the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship 


























Figure 6.  Boundary Set by the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship209 
D. ANALYSIS OF RESOLUTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
When each period is analyzed for the general profitability of maintaining territory 
as bargaining leverage, the information shows that the attempts from this dyad are less 
likely to follow the realist argument (see Table 7). Other than the potential Lennox-
Becasses exchange in 1960, HR1 was not an issue. In all eight resolution attempts, HR1 
failed to turn up as a factor; therefore, we can reject all realist arguments in this dyad.  
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Table 7.   How Each Hypothesis Explains Each Attempt at Resolution for the 
Chile–Argentina Dyad 
 
The desire for mutual cooperation and peace among the Chilean-Argentine dyad 
was a big factor in all of the attempts. In three of the four cases that resulted in full 
resolution, at least one other IV was present. The final attempt applies three of the 
independent variables, still rejecting the realist-based hypothesis. The 1977 is the main 
outlier: despite having the makings of a full resolution, the attempt is later nullified by 
Argentina. The renegade rejection of the determination was a reaction to an Award that 
fully favored Chile rather than mutually beneficial or lent itself to any compromise. 
Since the final resolution, the countries have “advanced further in their security 
cooperation agenda.”210 The number of initiatives they have managed to create may not 
have been possible without first attaining this enduring resolution; Kristina Mani agrees 
that territorial disputes would have prevented a strong and durable relationship in their 
security cooperation.211 To this day, there exists an unsolved dispute regarding the 
Patagonian ice fields; because of their histories of strong democratic transitions, 
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DV: Outcome of 
Resolution 
Attempt 
1881 No Yes No Yes 4 
1893 No Yes No Yes 4 
1902 No Yes Yes No 4 
1915 No Yes Yes No 3 
1938 No Yes Yes No 3 
1960 No Yes Yes No 3 
1977 No Yes Yes Yes 2 
1984 No Yes Yes Yes 4 
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Argentina and Chile have both gained experience in managing their relationship in order 
to mutually benefit from one another.212 
The majority of arbitrations regarding the Beagle Channel conflict have gone to 
international parties. The second liberal argument played a factor for most of the 
attempts, but particularly headlined in the final resolution. In Chile’s many territorial 
matters, the Beagle Channel had been the fourth resolution via arbitration involving 
Argentina.213 Jose Miguel Barros, Ambassador and Agent for Chile, once indicated that 
the Arbitral Award had “intrinsic worth as a juridical instrument,” since the decision was 
comprised of players who “represent the main forms of civilization and the principal 
legal systems of the world.”214 This view captures the general Chilean attitude regarding 
the use of international adjudication, coming from a long line of favorable arbitral 
awards. Schultz theorizes that states would seek to have a resolution managed by a third 
party primarily due to fear—fear that it would not be implemented or ratified if 
accomplished solely by the participants, or fear of the costs that making concessions 
would generate.215 Beth Simmons’ findings show evidence that when there has been a 
history of multiple ratification attempts and failures, the likelihood of arbitration 
increases.216 She also presents that those governments operating in or striving for some 
form of liberal democracy tend to be more willing for a decision made by an outside 
party—as in the case with this chapter’s dyad.217 Also, when both share an affinity for 
the role of institutions and a particular form of governance, they will be more apt to place 
the responsibilities of their affairs into that which is governed by the rule of law.218 
During the years of the military regime in Argentina, there was a potential progression 
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toward military conflict; this led to a reluctance in settling by any means other than 
bilateral negotiations.   
Aside from the indisputable power of political discourse, the Vatican’s 
encouragement played a dual role while acting as mediator. In the last few resolution 
attempts, his emphasis on the importance of the dispute resolution influenced the actions 
of each country. In 1977, Argentina annulled a decision issued by the world’s highest 
court. Their government’s strong backing on the rejection influenced that of the public 
and the press—essentially saber rattling in Chile’s presence. Alfonsín’s commitment to 
resolve the issue as part of his political promise, however, contributed to the Pope’s 
overall process in the treaty. Presidential power furthered the progress toward 
cooperation with the timing of Pinochet and Alfonsín.219 
The presence of liberal and constructivist arguments both factored in the dyad’s 
dispute resolution. The practice of diplomatic relations was a mainstay in many of these 
occasions, and the implementation of external arbiters or the strong advocacy of 
government contributed to a sound settlement. Argentina, in fact, even found itself close 
to the brink of war. In the span of over a century, this dyad has been partial to considering 
diplomatic alternatives. The process used to settle this dispute is a “model of successful 
diplomacy” by refraining from war after years of controversy.220 The Pope was used as 
the mediator of “last recourse,” after multiple attempts of bilateral negotiations.221 The 
presence of compelling discourse coupled with a consistent practice of statesmanship and 
an external judge ultimately brought the Beagle Channel dispute to a close.   
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IV. CHILE–PERU DYAD  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV examines the second of this thesis’s case studies: the maritime border 
dispute between Chile and Peru. As former belligerents in the War of the Pacific, Chile 
and Peru have built their economic relations since the 2014 ruling at The Hague. On the 
economic side, both are members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OAS, and also 
founded, along with Colombia and Mexico, the Pacific Alliance.222 Since 2009’s Peru-
Chile Free Trade Agreement came into force, trade has benefitted both nations.223 As of 
2014, Peru was the fourth largest recipient of Chilean investment, and is still growing.224   
This relationship, however, was not always good-natured. After Chile had won 
the War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia in 1883, Chile gained control over a mass 
quantity of resource-rich regions along the Pacific Ocean.225 Between Chile and Peru, the 
Treaty of Ancón was signed, which allowed for a perpetual appropriation of the Arica 
and Tacna regions.226 According to the treaty, Chile was to occupy the provinces for ten 
years, and then through a plebiscite, the provinces would either stay with Chile or return 
to Peruvian control.227 Eventually in 1929, the Treaty of Lima was established—with the 
help of the United States—and outlined the current territorial claims of a Peruvian Tacna 
and a Chilean Arica.228 Unfortunately, neither of these treaties answered the maritime 
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boundary question, although the Treaty of Lima asserted, “no question relating to limits 
should remain pending.”229 
In 2008, Peru submitted an application to the ICJ concerning the delimitation of a 
Chile-Peru maritime boundary and the recognition of Peru’s sovereign rights to zone 200 
nautical miles from its coast but outside Chile’s EEZ.230 Chile argued the boundary had 
already been established from previous treaties and is defined by a parallel of latitude 
from their shared land boundary point out 200 nautical miles to the west.231   
Why does this matter? By delimiting the maritime boundary according to Chile’s 
justification, Peru would lose a significant zone of ocean space that falls into the 
Humboldt Current, an area rich in marine life.232 For Chile and Peru, an estimated $200 
million in annual fishing revenues were at stake, in addition to huge quantities of national 
pride.233 
In this dyad, Peru acted as the challenger state involved in a relationship long 
strained by a history of territorial disputes. This chapter on the Chile-Peru relationship 
first explores the background preceding Peru’s initial boundary challenge. Then, it 
analyzes a more contemporary effort at dispute resolution using the same set of IR-based 
hypotheses. From this analysis, I attempt to explain how and why Chile and Peru came to 
a resolution regarding a matter based on sea beds and water columns—that of a maritime 
boundary dispute. 
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B. BACKGROUND OF THE PERU-CHILE MARITIME BOUNDARY 
DISPUTE 
The differing claims in this dispute lie in the value placed on bilateral treaties and 
the law of the sea. The first three agreements are the most referenced in the Court’s 
decision and offer a prelude to the question of the maritime boundary dispute. 
1. 1947 Proclamation 
According to the Proclamation, Chile and Peru agreed on certain maritime rights 
extending 200 nautical miles originating from their coastlines.234 Both parties also agree 
that although maritime rights are proclaimed, the language does not indicate any 
formation of an international maritime boundary.235    
2. 1952 Santiago Declaration 
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru together “proclaim as a norm of their international 
maritime policy that they each possess exclusive sovereign and jurisdiction over the sea 
along the coasts of their respective countries to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles 
from these coasts.”236 Through this language, the ICJ determined this document to be an 
international treaty.237 Though parts of the Declaration appeared relevant to the subject of 
maritime borders, it failed to declaratively establish a lateral boundary from the point of 
the Chile-Peru sea-land point, much less characterize the boundary to follow a parallel of 
latitude.238 The result of the treaty was a boundary that ran close to the 181st parallel; 
later Peru would argue the premise of this treaty was “merely a fishing agreement that did 
not fix the maritime boundary.”239 
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3. 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement 
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru also signed the 1954 agreement that established a zone 
of tolerance. The point of origin started 12 nautical miles from the coast and 
encompassed an area 10 nautical miles of either side of the parallel (see Figure 7). The 
Zone’s purpose was twofold: it constituted the maritime boundary; and prevented 
national fishing vessels from inadvertent violations, avoiding “friction between the 
countries concerned.”240 The court found that an international boundary was named in 
this agreement but failed to specify “when and by what means the boundary was agreed 
upon.”241 This is to say that the agreement did not detail line of direction or boundary 
points. Similarly, during the Nicaragua v. Honduras dispute in 2007, the Court had 
previously stated, “Evidence of a tacit legal agreement must be compelling . . . a 
permanent maritime boundary is a matter of grave importance and agreement is not easily 
to be presumed.”242  
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Figure 7.  Agreement Annotating Special Maritime Frontier Zone of 10 nm on 
Each Side of Parallel243 
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4. 2008 Application to the International Court of Justice 
By 1997, Chile had signed and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is the legal authority for the oceans and seas of the 
world.244 Despite the fact that Peru contributed greatly to its creation in 1982, Peru is not 
a party member of the UNCLOS; the Peruvian Constitution prevented it from ratifying it, 
stating “in its maritime domain the State exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction, without 
prejudice to the freedom of international communications.”245 After Chile declared to the 
UN the existence of an agreed maritime boundary, Peru argued that Chile’s map was 
illegitimate since no treaty in the past had ever indicated consent by both parties.246 Peru, 
thus, sent an application to the ICJ challenging that very fact—a bilateral maritime 
boundary agreement did not exist; subsequently, Peru asked the Court to determine the 
Chile-Peru maritime boundary.247 In its application, Peru also made claim to the areas 
situated 200 nautical miles from its coastline, which overlap with Chile’s maritime 
claim.248 
Chile issued a counter-memorial in 2010, dismissing all claims by Peru. In return, 
Chile adjudged that an agreed maritime boundary existed. The acknowledgement and 
enforcement by Peru are found in the 1952 Declaration in Santiago (“the said line may not 
extend beyond that of the corresponding parallel at the point where the frontier of Peru 
reaches the sea”), and through the practical measures taken by both parties in 1968 and 1969 
(where each country built one lighthouse at the point where the common border entered the 
sea thereby marking the land and maritime boundary).249 Additionally, the boundary 
                                                 
244 Stephen Fietta and Robin Cleverly, Practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Boundary Delimitation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015), viii. 
245 Edward Ferrero Costa, “Latin America and the Law of the Sea,” in Regions, Institutions, and Law 
of the Sea: Studies in Ocean Governance, eds. Harry N. Scheiber and Jin-Hyun Paik (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 392. 
246 Maria Teresa Infante Caffi, “Peru v. Chile: The International Court of Justice Decides on the 
Status of the Maritime Boundary,” Chinese Journal of International Law 13 (2014), 746, accessed August 
10, 2016, DOI: 10.1093/chinesejil/jmu037. 
247 Ibid. 
248 International Court of Justice, “Application Instituting Proceedings Filed in the Registry of the 
Court on 16 January 2008,” 6. 
249 International Court of Justice.  “Counter-Memorial of the Government of Chile: Volume I,” March 
9, 2010, accessed August 20, 2016, 302–303, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/137/17188.pdf. 
 61 
followed a latitude parallel of 18° 21’ 00” S; and Peru was only entitled to the zone extending 
above said parallel.250 The basis of their defense was the tripartite of treaties from 1947, 
1952, and 1954.251 To augment the argument, Chile claimed the boundary had been adopted 
during the time the 200 nautical mile maritime limit was established and through years of 
established practice in the maritime regions (see Figure 8).252  
 
Figure 8.  Maritime Boundary Lines Claimed by Peru and Chile, 
Respectively253 
Chile understood that a maritime boundary already existed, and the Court should 
be summoned only to confirm its existence.254 Conversely, Peru disputed that fact, 
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arguing that the parallel Chile referenced is “totally inequitable” disadvantaging Peru.255 
As a result, the ICJ needed to determine whether a maritime boundary existed—if so, 
what was its blueprint? 
5. 2014 ICJ Ruling 
The ICJ made its decision on the dispute based on five issues. First, the Court 
needed to determine whether the parties had a maritime boundary agreement already in 
existence.256 Determination of this answer required a thorough comb-through of its 
previous bilateral treaties; the previous section details those agreements and shows that a 
binding maritime boundary was named, but unclear.257   
Second, was the nature of the boundary solely applicable to the water column, or 
did it include the seabed and the subsoil? Within the context of the 1947 Proclamation 
and the 1952 Santiago Declaration, maritime claims were described according to the sea-
bed and the waters that lay above it; the court named it as an “all-purpose” claim since no 
other distinctions were made.258 
Third, the extent of the agreed maritime boundary was next in question. The 
Court recalled the purpose of the agreement was to set up a zone of tolerance for fishing 
boats. Using the “relevant practice of the Parties” to help support the finding, the Court 
examined fisheries activity in the mid-1950s (relevant to the 1954 Agreement) and found 
that fishing boats seldom operated past 60 nautical miles from the coastline.259 The 200 
nautical mile zone between Peru and Chile, established in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
was to “protect the ‘Humboldt Current Large Maritime Ecosystem’”—not by the capacity 
of national fisherman to fish up to that particular point.260 Taking in the broader scope 
and the evidence provided, the Court determined that the agreed boundary extended to 80 
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nautical miles along the parallel from its point of origin on land.261 Today, it is still 
confusing to Chilean officials why the ICJ selected 80 miles, thereby reducing the 
parallel extension from 200 miles.262 
Fourth, the court needed to determine the start point of the maritime boundary 
agreed by both parties in 1954. Using the 1968–1969 lighthouse arrangements, the Court 
determined the maritime boundary start point is the where the line of latitude passes 
through Boundary Marker 1.263 
Fifth, the court was to resolve the boundary’s course from Point A—the 80 
nautical mile point at the end of the existing maritime boundary. To determine the 
boundary past Point A, the court utilized a standard three-stage procedure. The procedure 
established an equidistance line aimed at avoiding “excessive amputation” of either Chile 
or Peru’s projections.264 In conclusion, the Court’s ruling was the following: 
The Court concludes that the boundary between the Parties at the starts at 
the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary 
Marker No. 1 with the low-water line, and extends for 80 nautical miles 
along that parallel of latitude to Point A. From this point, the maritime 
boundary runs along the equidistance line to Point B, and then along the 
200-nautical-mile limit measured from the Chilean baselines to Point C.265 
In the end, both countries conceded something. Despite the fact that Peru only 
gained a smaller zone than desired, President Sebastián Piñera called it “a lamentable 
loss” for Chile; approximately 35 percent of its steady catch will be stripped.266 
Originally asking for 23,600 square miles of new fishing waters for its proposed 
boundary, Peru walked away carving about 8,000 square miles of Chile’s EEZ (see 
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Figure 9).267 Peru had envisioned the border advancing southward into Chilean territory, 
but accepted another 10,800 square miles of former international waters.268 The effort by 
the Court displeased both governments, yet both agreed to adhere to the verdict. 
 
Figure 9.  Claims by Chile and Peru and the ICJ’s Final Judgment269 
C. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES—ATTEMPT AT RESOLUTION 
1. Application of Hypotheses 
Peru unilaterally submitted the application to The Hague; why, then, did Chile 
take action and contest the dispute? Chile could have chosen to take the case, as is—no 
protest—but the Pacific power countered the argument with numerous occasions to 
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showcase their significant bilateral history.270 Accepting the controversy would, in the 
long run, only exacerbate other basic issues in the foreseeable future. By deciding to 
contest and cite previous settlements in accordance with the law of the sea, Chile might 
have anticipated its responses would advantage it in the greater diplomatic realm.271 
Neither Chile nor Peru came before the ICJ threatening to break off relations in lieu of 
the results; although national pride appeared to be an issue, their shared trust in the 
Court’s decision of an international boundary outweighed the politics.272 
At the time the ICJ received the case, the status quo was in Chile’s favor. Notably, 
in the weeks before the Court announced the ruling, both countries expressed publicly 
compliance to the outcome of the resolution.273 Given that Chile—the perceived target 
state in this dispute—blindly accepted the risk of losing the fishermen of Iquique and 
Arica in the north, the realist argument (HR1) can be ruled out. Arguably, the loss of fish 
worth more than $100 million a year was not salient enough to leave up to an 
unpredictable maritime boundary.274 States in a realist world would generally be 
concerned about the balance of power; in this case, the legitimate maritime boundary 
symbolized the available leverage that each country put at risk.275  
Despite the tumultuous history of bitter territorial exchanges, Chile and Peru 
recognized the benefits from resolving the enduring boundary dispute. There were many 
signs that leadership wished to move past the 19
th
 century war legacy. In a Public Sitting 
conducted on December 6, 2014, the Agent for Chile Van Klaveren Stork opened with 
the following:  
Chile and Peru have lived together in peace for 130 years. We have 
worked together on innumerable occasions to further economic integration 
and development and to improve the lives of our peoples. Chile conducts 
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its relations with Peru based on principles of good faith, mutual respect 
and observance of international agreements.276 
Though the mention of peaceful relations does not substantially appear in any of 
the written proceedings, I argue the very act of submitting a dispute to be strengthened by 
the ICJ demonstrates pursuit of a peaceful solution. Recently, Chile and Peru joined 
Colombia and Mexico to establish the Pacific Alliance in 2012, reinforcing their 
preference to benefitting economies across borders.277 Referring to cooperation and 
friendship, Peruvian President Ollanta Humala said in 2014, “the end of the dispute will 
allow us to begin a new stage in our relations with Chile,” which has shown much 
economic promise since then.278 Though the effects of the ruling mean that both states 
look to consider more technical issues such as base points and coordinates, as well as 
redefine the norms of the maritime environment, the doors of diplomacy have been 
opened because of their commitment to comply.279 Today, the general data shows both 
nations are profiting from bilateral investment and regional stability. Given that Chile and 
Peru consented to the unforeseeable settlement of the Court to continue maintaining 
mutual cooperation, the first liberal approach (HL1) can explain this outcome. 
In this resolution attempt, it is undoubtedly clear that the second liberal argument 
(HL2) played a role. Submitting a case to the ICJ is an expensive ordeal and takes a 
considerable amount of time to achieve a ruling—in this case, results finalized in six 
years.280 The Court has been considered the most authoritative court to date, relying on 
an inflexible group of judges that allow states very little participation in its 
proceedings.281 Throughout the development of their history, Latin American states have 
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had a propensity to build collective perceptions around neutrality and impartiality.282 By 
involving this process of legalization, the boundary dispute escaped major politicization 
and the likelihood for military conflict.283 To substantiate their consent for an 
international resolution body, both governments embedded their surroundings with 
people of judicial backgrounds.284 Moreover, as a consequence of Peru and Chile’s desire 
to avoid demilitarization of the boundary, the legal appeal of the ICJ provided that 
instrument of policy.285 While the states marked time until the ruling, the dispute was 
considered “temporarily frozen” and “In Court We Trust” was thus adopted as the dyad’s 
unofficial motto.286 This sort of pledge to adherence developed within both governments 
and led to a final resolution. 
This contemporary topic allowed for more accessible outlets on discourse, and in 
turn, more ways for political leadership to mobilize their constituents. In the broad scope 
of the matter, both administrations viewed the boundary dispute as an obstacle to 
continued integration and development. Though it was initially elevated to the 
international status through a unilateral process, both the target and challenger state 
actively drove the nature of the conflict. While former senior officials from both Chile 
and Peru have warned against a possible flare up in military operations, these opinions 
have been countered by incumbents who believe resources and funds should be spent on 
combatting poverty rather on weapons.287 At the hearing’s initiations in 2008, then-
Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, made it known that both countries were going to 
continue the “path of integration and friendship,” despite the lawsuit.288 Bachelet’s 
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leadership led the population to carry on while the ICJ determined a verdict. In a joint 
statement held in 2012, then-Peruvian President Humala stated that the nation “will 
comply and execute the sentence that will define the differences that we are bringing 
before this court.”289 Furthermore, then-Chilean President Piñera preached that Chile was 
“confident and at ease” over the impending verdict, adding that their country has, is, and 
will continue to be respectful of the international law process.290 Consequently, many 
people agreed in viewing the affair as an opportunity to put aside bitterness left from a 
war over a century ago.291 Given this evidence, the constructivist approach arguing the 
capacity of discourse toward resolution cannot be ruled out. 
D. ANALYSIS OF RESOLUTION AND CONCLUSION 
Provided Chile and Peru’s history, the question of bilateral conduct of diplomacy 
arises. There exists a sense of obscurity surrounding whether an agreed maritime 
boundary had been a concern prior to Peru’s 2008 filing. Given the economic stakes, Peru 
claimed it had been seeking to bilaterally discuss the issue since 1985; according to Peru, 
Former Peruvian Foreign Minister Allan Wagner had first brought these boundary 
concerns to his Chilean counterpart Jaime del Valle.292 This was followed up with a 
Memorandum to Chile written by the Peruvian Ambassador, Juan Miguel Bákula.293 The 
note encompassed a peaceable tone, expressing that the established 200-mile zone gave 
the maritime zone a different meaning, given the characteristics of the sea’s marine 
resources.294 The memorandum also communicated that the formula used to determine 
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Chile’s so-called boundary was “no longer adequate to meet the requirements of the 
security needs” of the parties involved and leaving it to “broad interpretation could lead 
to an inequitable situation and therefor risk for Peru.”295   
What might have caused Chile and Peru to rely on an international resolution 
body for this dispute? Sotomayor argues that those elected democratically are often 
incentivized—and increasingly tempted—to participate in international institutions as a 
means to remove an issue from the environment of domestic politics and geopolitics.296 
In practice, the majority of Latin American countries have treated maritime disputes as a 
case for the ICJ.297  This similar process will be revisited in Chapter V. 
After Chile fought with Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, Chile’s 
military advantage gained additional territorial assets enriched with natural resources that 
benefit its economy today. Since the second half of the twentieth century, however, 
solving problems by way of war in Latin America are diminished; the ideology of a 
shared feeling of Latin Americanism fostered a containment of militarized disputes.298 
Chilean histories concerning territorial disputes have thus far involved integration and 
arbitration, despite the economic, military, and technological advantage it maintains 
throughout the entire continent. Chile may have considered arbitration in the past even if 
it did not “expect any better deal from an arbitrator or a court” because of how it would 
bolster its reputation; if an external party would have arrived at the same outcome as a 
political compromise between Chile and its challenger states, this process of arbitration 
would make Chile appear more cooperative and diplomatic—whereas the former might 
indicate weakness.299 In fostering those values of cooperation and the willingness to 
maintain democratic peace, research shows that political discourse can add to the impact. 
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Once again, the liberal and constructivist arguments found in this chapter 
highlight factors attributable toward dispute resolution (see Table 8). The ICJ judgment 
was a major step forward in facilitating diplomatic relations between two former 
belligerents, and it is hopeful that the same process can work for Bolivia in their quest for 
sovereign sea access. 
Table 8.   How Each Hypothesis Explains the Attempt at Resolution 
for the Chile–Peru Dyad 


























V. CHILE–BOLIVIA DYAD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter V examines Chile and Bolivia, a relationship that has remained generally 
strained since Chile dismembered the land once connecting Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean.   
Outside of a short period in the 1970s, Chile and Bolivia relations have been poor for 
decades.300 Despite sharing a border, Bolivia holds in contention the area lost from the 
War of the Pacific; even more so, the landlocked country seeks a fully sovereign access 
west to the ocean.   
The subject of access to the sea has been revived in different forms, from 
discussing the establishment of a land-to-sea corridor301 to calling Chile to act on their 
obligation for negotiation to the sea (Bolivia’s current submission to the ICJ).302  Unlike 
in Peru’s case, the issue presented in this chapter has been a salient one for over 130 
years.  
The impact of geography has been a sticking point for Bolivia. It has had nearly 
free ocean access, paying transport costs tariff-free for exports through Chilean ports; 
however, it claims that Chile’s commitment to free transit is “not as wonderful as [they 
like] to portray.”303 Bolivia’s hope is for Chile to return sovereign access in the form of 
land, particularly, the territory that once housed copper deposits once under Bolivian soil. 
The lost land known as the Antofagasta region has since contributed largely to Chile’s 
export economy—with Bolivia sitting next door, observing their neighbor prosper from 
the coastline and its adjoining territory.   
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In this final case study, I examine the dispute resolution attempts to predict what 
factors likely lead to the type of resolution that endures longer than the period of dispute. 
The official endeavors I present are predominantly initiated by Bolivia—this dyad’s 
challenger state, which suggests the nature of their diplomatic relations. Chapter V aims 
to examine three things. First, I discuss the background of the enduring dispute. Second, I 
consider the nations’ official resolution attempts, including the 1866 Boundary Treaty; 
the 1872 Lindsay-Corral Protocol, the 1874 Treaty of Limits; the 1904 Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship; the 1975 Charaña Embrace; the 2006–2010 13 Points; and the 2013 ICJ 
case filed against Chile. Third, drawing upon the analyses of outcomes through IR-based 
hypotheses, I speculate that my liberal and constructivist approaches apply in this dyad’s 
ultimate outcome. By studying lessons learned from Chile’s previous geopolitical affairs, 
I forecast what factors are most likely to ensure a full settlement, and in turn, may 
indicate a general application theory for dispute resolution. 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE FOR SOVEREIGN 
ACCESS TO THE SEA 
In April 2013, Bolivia filed an application to start proceedings against Chile’s 
“obligation to negotiate in good faith and effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an 
agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.”304 The 
application specifically mentioned that their issue was not the dispute of the 1904 treaty, 
but of the obligation Chile has to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea, and its 
repudiation of that obligation.305 Bolivia’s claim of such an obligation is based on a 
question of international law, relating to the existence and breach of an obligation. Chile 
is being asked to negotiate on good faith, based on agreements in the past.  
Bolivia continues to push for its entitlement—as a challenger state—to “take all 
measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for . . . shall in no way 
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infringe [its] legitimate interests.”306 Chile, on the other hand, claims to already afford it 
access to the sea, and is in accordance with Article 125 from the UN Convention of the 
Law of the Sea—“land-locked states shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory 
of transit States by all means of transport.”307 In Article 125, special terms and modalities 
“shall be agreed between the land-locked States and transit States concerned through 
bilateral, sub-regional, or regional agreements”; Chile asserts that this Bolivia has not 
even asked the ICJ to determine the specific modality of sovereign access, therefore, 
should not concern the ICJ.308   
Throughout the proceedings, Bolivia failed to provide a definition of sovereign 
access to the sea, as access can take form in many ways—a corridor, coastal enclave, 
special zone, or something else. This thesis, nevertheless, has identified characteristics 
that perhaps might ratify the resolution for good; digging through previous efforts may 
strengthen these factors as part of an overall principle for dispute resolution in Latin 
America. 
C. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES—ATTEMPTS AT RESOLUTION 
1. 1866 Resolution Attempt: Treaty of Mutual Benefits (Treaty of 
Limits) 
Chile and Bolivia attained independence from the Spanish in 1818 and 1825, 
respectively, building their nations upon the basis of uti possidetis juris. As in many early 
Latin American state formations, borderlines remained ill defined until resource 
discoveries introduced complications; both countries at least partially claimed the 
Atacama region during the uncertainty. Upon the discoveries of natural resources such as 
nitrates and guano in the desert region, territorial disputes materialized. In the early 
1800s, Bolivia and Chile were laying claim to overlapping areas defined by parallels, 
leading Bolivia to reach a peaceful settlement with Chile. Many scholars agree that war 
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would have ensued if not for the Spanish presence that remained until the late 1860s; 
consequently, a regional alliance formed out of solidarity against the Spanish.309 
In 1866, Chile and Bolivia produced the Treaty of Mutual Benefits where both 
countries renounced former lines and re-established a boundary at the 24th
 
parallel (see 
Figure 10). Chile pursued this settlement after failing to establish an alliance with Bolivia 
against Peru; this was in part to the increased Peruvian nitrate control over Chile at the 
time.310 To address the mineral resources matter, a zone of “joint mineral exploration” 
was also established, allowing both to earn equally from profits and revenues derived in 
the region.311 Although the treaty allowed for Bolivia to set up a customs house at the 
port of Mejillones (occupied de facto by Chile), Chile gained the better part of the 
deal.312 
Despite that Chile, through this treaty, formally recognized Bolivia’s sovereignty 
over the coasts of the Pacific Ocean, there were still many questions concerning 
interpretations by both countries, which complicated diplomatic relations.313 The 
government of Bolivia heavily criticized the terms, and additional interpretations of the 
treaty unnerved its alliance to Chile. To Bolivia’s misfortune, its attempt to clarify and 
revise the 1866 Treaty dissolved when the Bolivian National Assembly voided any acts 
done by the previous regime, which was led by the incompetent self-appointed dictator, 
General Melgarejo.314 
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Figure 10.  1866 Treaty of Mutual Benefits315 
a. Key Outcomes of Treaty 
Most scholarship shows that Chile and Bolivia signed the Treaty to resolve the 
border question but promptly became discontent with it due to its multiple 
interpretations.316 Within its seven articles, the main points concerned the exploitation of 
nitrates and guano and the drawing of the international boundary. 
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b. Application of Hypotheses 
During the 19th century, realism played a role in state shaping due in part to the 
“balancing of alliances”; the regional states’ potential economic gains influenced the 
establishment of these borders and zones.317 Accounts of the Chilean-Bolivian exchange 
demonstrate an asymmetrical approach to resolution. The impetus for Chile to resolve the 
dispute with Bolivia was largely influenced by the threat of Peru for Pacific hegemony. 
During the 1866 negotiations, Chile had once volunteered to help Bolivia acquire Arica 
and Tacna—Peruvian provinces—but if Bolivia would give up its coastal outposts of 
Mejillones and Paposo.318 Bolivia declined the offer, but this indicated the ambitions of 
Chile to gain control of the coastal territory.319 Additionally, Bolivia believed it was 
entitled to a border much further south of the 24th parallel.320 Ultimately, both 
governments were on good terms in their alliance against the Spanish colonizers, 
agreeing to settle on the 24th parallel and the shared zones between parallels 23 and 
25.321 Given that Chile and Bolivia both afforded its neighbor equal benefits in areas 
outside of its boundary (despite the resource advantage favored to Chile, learned later), 
the realist approach (HR1) can help to explain this outcome. 
Chile and Bolivia came to an agreement based on the perceived mutual benefits 
from the shared zones. Article 2 of the Treaty explicitly states that 
The Republics of Bolivia an Chile shall share equally the proceeds of the 
exploitation of the guano de posits discovered in Mejillones . . . as well as 
the export duties which shall be collected upon the minerals mined within 
the same territorial extension.322  
A leading factor in this outcome relies on gains from the joint deal; therefore, the 
first liberal hypothesis (HL1) can certain account for the result. 
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Article 1 of the Treaty refers to a “commission of properly qualified experts, half 
of whose members shall be appointed by each one of the high contracting parties” to 
survey the exact Chile-Bolivia border line.323 Despite reference to qualified experts, the 
Treaty does not give them agency for the bilateral decision. Given that there are no 
international parties, we can rule out the second liberal approach (HL2) in this period. 
The constructivist argument does not apply to the 1866 outcome as well. A 
number of Bolivians who opposed President Melgarejo and those were even aware of the 
littoral significance critiqued the signing of the agreement, but this did not impact the 
outcome.324 Despite the Treaty being favorable to Chile, Melgarejo failed to counter with 
a plan to regain more control; instead, he gave away land and acted in accordance to his 
personal greed without much regard for promoting specific terms to the population.325 
Provided that he had little to no influence or regard for public support, HC1 does not 
apply. 
This period shows the DV was influenced by factors of realism and of mutual 
cooperation (see Table 9). However, other than mutual recognition that Bolivia once had 
coastline territory, many issues were left unsolved from this Treaty; the lack of attention 
to detail left relations to deepen in conflict.  
Table 9.   Hypotheses Application to the 1866 Treaty of Mutual Benefits 
(Boundary Treaty) 


















Yes Yes No No 4 
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2. 1872 Resolution Attempt: Lindsay–Corral Protocol 
Upon the installation of Federico Errázuriz as Chile’s new president, both 
Bolivian and Chilean governments made efforts to directly negotiate a plan to clarify the 
1866 Treaty’s vague provisions.326 Criticisms from the 1866 Treaty brought about six 
months of discussions, culminating in the Lindsay-Corral Protocol of 1872. Negotiations 
between the two countries also renewed, since one of the terms opened up an opportunity 
for Chile and Bolivia to compromise on a future replacement treaty that mutually benefits 
both governments.327 Despite rejection from Peru, both ratified the treaty. 
a. Key Outcomes of Protocol 
The pact emphasized the 24th parallel as the boundary, specified the cooperation 
of Bolivian and Chilean customs officers in the shared zone, and recorded the addition of 
materials other than metals listed in the previous agreement.328 The Protocol, naturally, 
drew more criticisms from Bolivia. While the Chilean government described the pact as 
“nothing more than a clarification of the treaty of 1866 and claimed its rights had not 
increased,” a number of Bolivians from the National Assembly believed it augmented 
their influence.329 Additionally, Peru expressed concern of Chile’s quest for regional 
dominance via the agreement, encouraging Bolivia to refuse the Protocol; afraid to hurt 
relations with Chile, Bolivia agreed to a secret defense alliance with Peru before 
appeasing Chile.330   
Subsequently, Peru and Bolivia signed a Secret Treaty in 1873 promising to aid 
the other in situations of national sovereignty and maintaining independence.331 While 
this seemed harmless at the time, Chile’s awareness of this treaty was undoubtedly the 
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pretext for the war to come. Although unfavorable to Bolivia, Peru urged its neighbor to 
sign the Treaty of Sucre in 1874—at the threat of Chile’s new ironclad cruiser during an 
age that was still dominated by wooden ships.332   
b. Application of Hypotheses 
According to Chile, the Protocol was intended to explicate terms of the Treaty of 
1866. Though most of the terms seem, in part, to favor Chile, Bolivia came to the table 
only after signing a defense treaty alliance with Peru. At this time, the Peruvian naval 
force was regarded as the dominant force along the Pacific; the subsequent secret treaty 
might have afforded Bolivia with additional leverage against both states, if needed.333 
Although Peru had urged Bolivia to disapprove the treaty due to the potential for Chile’s 
influence to grow, Bolivia might have chosen to settle because the Peruvian alliance 
provided an element of security. I argue that Bolivia, influenced by Peru, made a tradeoff 
between its territory and the defense treaty. Given that Bolivia agreed to Chile’s terms 
because it did not sense an immediate threat, the realist approach can explain the 
outcome. 
Like the 1866 Treaty, the Protocol asked for continuing relations to be conducted 
“pacifically and amiably.”334 Provided that the document was established as a 
clarification of specific provisions and a calling for both parties’ cooperation, the first 
liberal approach can also explain the outcome. 
Both countries came to a resolution without use of a third party, much less an 
international resolution body. Additionally, the dissent that rose from the Bolivian 
National Assembly had very little impact on the results. Provided those reasons, both the 
constructivist and the second liberal approaches can be ruled out.  
In line with the 1866 Treaty of Mutual Benefits, this period demonstrates 
consistencies in the approaches employed to reach a territorial resolution (see Table 10). 
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In the next section, the dyad finally agrees on a substitute for the ambiguous boundary 
treaty; regrettably, this will be overcome by events that further complicate relations. 
Table 10.   Hypotheses Application to the 1872 Lindsay–Corral Protocol 



















Yes Yes No No 4 
 
3. 1874 Treaty of Limits between Bolivia and Chile (Treaty of Sucre/ 
Martinez-Baptista Agreement) 
In November 1874, Chile and Bolivia established a new boundary treaty to annul 
the 1866 Treaty.335 Eleven months earlier, Chile had become aware of the Peru-Bolivia 
“secret treaty,” and decided to play it safe with this set of provisions.336 While Chilean 
Prime Minster Carlos Walker Martinez insisted on discussing a new plan with Bolivia 
regarding nitrate deposits in the Atacama, José de la Riva Agüero, Peruvian Minister in 
Bolivia, urged its neighbor to break its arrangement with Chile or for an “unambiguous 
definite settlement to be reached between the two new warships of Chile be finished.”337 
With word of a new, armed ironclad ship at sea, Peru then advised Bolivia to accept the 
Martinez proposals to avoid any new complications. Chile’s strengthening navy afforded 
its government to impose just about any conditions on Bolivia regarding the littoral, so it 
was important for Bolivia to ratify. The Martinez-Baptista Agreement (referring to the 
dyad’s prime ministers, signatories of the Treaty), or Treaty of Sucre, became the new 
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treaty of limits; in July 1875, supplementary articles were added on to address the 
questions of arbitration, territorial specifics, and urgency to ratify.338 The parties 
complied with the Treaty, but only until the War of Pacific broke in 1878. 
a. Key Outcomes of Treaty 
In the new Treaty of Limits, both states re-established the 24th parallel as the 
boundary.339 Joint fiscal control was relinquished, favoring Bolivia and granting it the 
authority to collect all tax revenue from the 23rd and 24th parallel. This agreement 
contained a clause that stipulated that current taxes would not be subject to any increase 
for the next 25 years; this action would ameliorate Bolivian-Chilean relations.340 With 
respect to future disputes, all under treaty would be settled by arbitration.341  
b. Application of Hypotheses 
In terms of the settlement, the international boundary line had not changed. In 
fact, the mutual benefits were different for each party—Bolivia acquiring full rights to a 
former mining zone and Chile receiving a secure tax for 25 years. Chile agreed to an 
economic concession of the zone between the 23rd and 24th parallels, but made gains 
independent of territory. At the same time, Chile was increasing its inventory of naval 
ships, which would become valuable in the following years. In this period, Chile 
conceded by relinquishing its rights to condominium without perceiving a loss to its 
overall status. Given those factors, the realist argument can explain the outcome of 
resolution.  
Economically, the Treaty provisions had profited both Chile and Bolivia but not 
without the aid of security reinforcements, such as the secret Peruvian-Bolivian alliance 
or defense buildup of Chile. Both parties reached a settlement—in spite of its hasty 
process—to institute a border and a plan to benefit from shared interests. Since both 
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states perceived mutual cooperation would service beneficially, the first liberal 
hypothesis can also be applied to the outcome of this period. 
Continuing in their dyadic pattern, Chile and Bolivia reached a resolution through 
bilateral means. They employed the same practices to create the supplementary treaty in 
1875 as well. Additionally, there is no evidence in my research of political leadership 
promoting discourse in favor or against of a resolution. Based on these continuing forms 
of settlement, the international resolution and discourse arguments are disregarded. 
In summary, only two of the four arguments are present in this outcome, which 
results in resolution (see Table 11). This would be the last time Chile would recognize 
Bolivia’s sovereignty of the littoral before the loss of land as specified in the 1904 Treaty. 
Table 11.   Hypotheses Application to the 1874 Treaty of Limits 

















Yes Yes No No 4 
 
4. Resolution Attempt: The War of the Pacific 
In 1878, a new administration overlooked the guarantee for stable taxes in the 
mutual benefits zone. The Congress of Bolivia broke the contract when they imposed 
taxes on the nitrate company by adding ten cents of tax per quintal of mineral extracted; 
the increase was intended to raise money for the regions hit hard from a string of natural 
disasters.342 A series of exchanges between the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway 
Company—backed by Chile—and Bolivia resulted from the broken amity.343 Angered, 
Chile argued that the tax increase violated the treaty signed in 1874.344 The ensuing 
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conflict became known as the War of the Pacific, and was dominated by Peru and the 
Chilean Navy; however, the Bolivia-Peru alliance forced Chile’s hand to declare war on 
the both of them. News of Chile’s secret declaration of war in 1879 on both Peru and 
Bolivia arrived without giving both countries time to strengthen their navies.345 The 
Chilean occupation of Lima and other victories left Peru and Bolivia ultimately 
defeated.346 In 1883, Chile and Peru signed the Treaty of Ancon, transferring the 
province of Tarapacá—home of the major port of Iquique—to Chilean hands.347 In 1884, 
a truce between Chile and Bolivia resulted in the annexation of the littoral Antofagasta 
region, a highly resourced region with nitrates, copper, and other minerals.348 Also 
during this truce, the Bolivian government representatives explicitly proclaimed that it 
would never “resign itself to not having a sovereign outlet to the sea.”349 
a. 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Chile and Bolivia 
Until 1904, no peace had been attempted between Bolivia and Chile. During the 
truce, notes and discussions exchanged between nations, but it was understood between 
both that nothing would transpire until the Chile received Tacna-Arica—this would not 
be done for another ten years after the truce.350  Despite Bolivia’s endeavors to reach an 
official peace agreement, the country received a lot of pushback. Abraham König one of 
the most notable notes had been issued by the Chilean plenipotentiary in La Paz, wrote: 
“It is a common error . . . in the press the opinion that Bolivia has the right to demand a 
port in compensation for her littoral . . . Chile has occupied the littoral and has taken 
possession of it with the same title . . . by which the United States . . . has taken Porto 
[sic] Rico.”351  
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Nonetheless, Alberto Gutiérrez, the Bolivian minister, suggested to his Congress 
that Bolivia should prepare to relinquish their “aspiration for a seaport on the Pacific,” 
but to understand that other forms of compensation would be negotiated.352 It was 
important for Bolivia to receive recompense due to the incurred financial debts from the 
loss of coastline.353 While Chile was in negotiations with Brazil over their Pactos de 
Mayo, came to Santiago to negotiate an official peace treaty.354 
Chile soon came together with Bolivia to prepare a comprehensive treaty that 
would “re-establish the peace that was shattered in 1879.”355 The 1904 Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship guaranteed two major concessions to Bolivia—a railway connecting the 
port of Arica to La Paz, built by Chile; and free commercial transit for Bolivia across 
Chile.356 Chile also mitigated Bolivia’s financial troubles by assuming its obligations to 
commercial and private Chilean investments, affording Bolivians more fiscal 
independence.357 On October 20, 1904, both accepted the peace treaty recognizing “the 
absolute and perpetual dominion of Chile over the territories it [had] occupied”358—Chile 
as proprietor of the coast and Bolivia a fully landlocked nation. 
(1) Key Outcomes of Treaty 
The most significant outcome is Bolivia’s loss of the littoral, as well as sovereign 
access to the sea. For Bolivia, this was considered an official recognition of Chilean 
territory, but for Chile, this resolution was considered a “diplomatic victory.”359 In 
addition to outlining 96 points demarcating the boundary, the treaty maintained Chile’s 
previous declarations concerning Bolivia’s coastal access, derived from the transfer of 
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territories just 20 years prior.360 Furthermore, Chile was skilled in tying Bolivia’s 
circumstances to those of Chile; the only way Bolivia could be guaranteed a railway to 
Arica or a free port of entry there, the Tacna-Arica problem would have to favor Chile.361 
(2) Application of Hypotheses 
Bolivia, acting on its desire to avoid further financial duress, was considered the 
challenger state in this phase. It pushed Chile to attempt a negotiated settlement; 
consequently, Bolivia obtained a number of indemnities that ultimately benefitted in the 
short run. The treaty was also instrumental to its perpetual dominance of the Pacific.362 
The target state acquired additional territory; therefore, the realist hypothesis does not 
apply in this case because there was no leverage lost or threat to national security. On the 
other side, Bolivia relied on the resolution to stay relevant in international affairs. The 
railway, large sum payment, and profit earned from nitrates in the transferred region 
benefitted the Bolivians, but ultimately the provisions forced them to become financially 
dependent on the victor.363 
By the very nature of the treaty’s purpose, Bolivia and Chile took this opportunity 
to reconstruct their relations through a number of concessions. They respected the rules 
of war in a peaceful approach; the winner gained much more in wealth than the loser and 
both republics agreed upon those terms. Rather than choosing to use force, both came to 
the negotiating table to replace the indeterminate truce first established after the war and 
to generate a more suitable living arrangement. Given the fact that Chile and Bolivia held 
the treaty as a certified symbol of the shared will to move forward, the democratic peace 
aspect of the first liberal hypothesis can explain the outcome. 
Although the resolution was jointly settled upon, the last article of the 1904 
agreement directed all questions “regarding the understanding or execution of this treaty 
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shall be submitted to the Emperor of Germany for arbitration.”364 Considering that they 
chose a third party as a prospective conciliator, both nations either anticipated the 
discovery of incomplete items or believed that even their peace had limits. The resolution 
contained a fail-safe, demonstrating that the second liberal hypothesis—based on the 
international resolution body—contributed to the attempt of ending the dispute. 
The circumstances after the war did not quite afford Bolivia a choice in signing or 
rejecting the resolution. What mattered to Bolivia were the provisions of the treaty, and 
whether they would have relieved the standstill existing between the two states. At this 
point in time, the resources Bolivia had lost to Chile forced it into a corner; therefore, it 
was unnecessary to convince the population for support. Political discourse was not a 
strong component of the resolution attempt and precludes the constructivist hypothesis. 
As a predictable mechanism of war indemnity, the outcome of the resolution was 
expected. Through the peace treaty, Chile was able to offer Bolivia restitution of the 
riches they lost through the annexation, and allowed Bolivia to direct its efforts on 
settling financial debts and making preparations for the railway. During this period, the 
liberal hypotheses factored in this significant settlement, which would be later set as a 
point of departure for Bolivia’s plight as a landlocked state (see Table 12).  
Table 12.   Hypotheses Application to the 1866 Treaty of Mutual Benefits 
(Boundary Treaty) 
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5. Charaña Negotiations 
The Act of Charaña—often referred to as the Charaña Embrace—stemmed from a 
meeting between Chilean President Augusto Pinochet and Bolivian President Hugo 
Banzer at the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974 (see Figure 11). At the sesquicentennial 
celebration of the Battle of Ayacucho, eight Latin American countries came to consider 
limit acquisitions of arms to concentrate on developing their economies.365 Pinochet 
sought an ally in Banzer’s regime and together they viewed the circumstances fit for 
resolving their maritime disagreements.366 On February 8, 1975, both presidents signed 
the Joint Declaration of Charaña, named after the Bolivian town, where they agreed to 
continue constructive discussions toward solving the dyad’s critical issues.367 
In December 1975, Bolivia received a note from Chile accepting the obligation to 
grant Bolivia a maritime coastline in addition to a transfer of sovereign rights. 
Specifically, in spirit of the Charaña negotiations, Chile proposed to connect that area of 
littoral—just north of Arica up to the Línea de Concordia—with a strip connecting 
Bolivia territory to the sea, outlined in the note.368 This phrasing, which constituted an 
internationally acceptable basis for conciliation, gave Bolivia the backing to present the 
dispute to The Hague.369  
Both governments dedicated efforts to revive bilateral relations that originated in 
the War of the Pacific; to their disfavor, Peru declined to grant Bolivian access to the sea 
because the proposed corridor would run between Peru and Chile, a corridor that Peru 
refused to relinquish.370 A protocol within the 1926 Treaty of Lima specifies that if Chile 
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were to yield former Peruvian territory to Bolivia, Peru would first be consulted; Peru 
consented to the cession of territory, but only if the area at the coast would be under the 
shared sovereignty of all three states.371 Chile refused Peru’s proposal (see Figure 12), 
which diminished Bolivia’s chance for a path to the sea and added to the eventual 
diplomatic breakup of negotiations between Pinochet and Banzer in 1978.372   
 
Figure 11.  General Augusto Pinochet (Left) and General Hugo Banzer (Right), 
at the Meeting in Charaña (Known as the “Charaña Embrace”) 
in 1975373 
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Figure 12.  Sketch of the Corridor Proposed by Chile to Bolivia in 1975 (Left); 
Sketch of Bolivian Corridor with Zone of Shared Sovereignty, as 
Proposed by Peru (Right)374 
a. Key Outcomes of Negotiations 
The Declaration of Charaña appeared to have much promise in re-energizing 
diplomatic relations between Chile and Bolivia. The declarations Chile had made, to 
include an enumeration of corridor points, clearly confirmed intent toward a solution for 
Bolivia’s landlocked state. In the December 1975 note, Chile also proposed that the 
cession would “be conditioned by a simultaneous exchange of territories,” meaning 
Bolivia would offer a compensatory area to Chile equivalent to land it gained in the 
north.375 In these discussions, both heads of government expressed a constructive attitude 
toward “a policy of harmony,” only to have their plans complicated by Peru.376 Though 
against the terms of the Treaty of Lima, the Declaration specifically stated, “Both 
Governments would commit not to cede the exchanged territories to a third power,” 
summoning an imminent complication from Peru. If negotiations had been successful, 
Bolivia’s need for a path to the sea would be met. Unfortunately, Chile’s willingness to 
negotiate with Bolivia was not consistent with its willingness with Peru. 
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b. Application of Hypotheses 
State behavior is often in response to other state threats—in this case, threats from 
Peru hindered the potential for a resolution to take place.377  The Treaty of Lima in 1929 
was regarded as a valued agreement representing Chile-Peru relations. Chile, as the target 
state, attempted to negotiate for Bolivian sea access, but the endeavor failed due to its 
connection to Peru. The capacity for stable trilateral relations weakened as a result of 
Chile’s victory of the War of the Pacific. In the end, Chile was willing to concede 
territory to Bolivia, but was unwilling to submit to a shared zone of sovereignty with 
Peru—its only maritime competitor. Chile’s actions indicated that even its desire for 
harmony had its limits. Given that Chile perceived that Peru’s proposal for a shared zone 
would affect its status as a power, HR1 can explain the failed results. 
The governments entered into a renewal of bilateral relations with the aim of 
pursuing formulas of resolution.378 Peru’s proposal to the dyad threatened Chile’s power 
and led it to perceive that a concession of territory—bilateral or trilateral—would be 
more harmful to its status quo. The ending of negotiations occurred when Chile refused 
to accept Peru’s proposal and when Bolivia broke diplomatic ties due to impatience of 
action. Given that Chile perceived the suggestion for shared sovereignty was more costly 
than beneficial—regardless of the fact it would solve Bolivia’s principal issue—the first 
liberal argument can explain the outcome.  
The deliberations of this period were between Chile and Bolivia only. 
Independent factors contributed to the shaping of discussions, to include the support of 
the OAS, but the parties made no use of an external mediator for a resolution; therefore, 
HL2 can be ruled out. 
After receipt of Chile’s December 1975 note, Banzer expressed acceptance of the 
suggested territorial exchange as a base of negotiation because he believed the nation of 
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Chile would not accept any other form of compensation other than territory.379 Verbal 
Stockmeyer argues that the “mere mention of a possible territorial exchange” 
inconvenienced Banzer because of the strong opposition from the public.380 Regardless, 
Banzer stood by for Chile to take on the motion of a joint controlled area until 1978, 
before the end of his military regime. He made steps to promote the agreement, but after 
years of anticipation, Banzer removed Bolivia from the state of negotiations. Given the 
mismatch of discourse to outcome, HC1 is ruled out.  
Despite the failure of Bolivia and Chile to attain a resolution, the Charaña 
Embrace was a brief political and diplomatic attempt of a mutual territorial transfer. 
Political commitments eventually impacted gains made from the initial meeting. Unlike the 
previous outcome that resulted post-war, the outcome followed the patterns of HR1 and HL1 
hypotheses, suggesting that these arguments alone are not enough to solidify a final 
conclusion. 
Table 13.   Hypotheses Application to the 1975 Charaña Embrace 
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6. 13 Point Agenda (13 Puntos) 
In 2006, both outgoing Chilean President Ricardo Lagos and incoming President 
Michele Bachelet visited with newly elected President Evo Morales of Bolivia to discuss 
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a way ahead.381 Cooperatively, they explored the possibilities to export Bolivian gas 
through maritime access in addition to a number of political discussions.382 Bachelet and 
Morales generated the 13 Point Agenda, which included points of negotiation such as 
border integration, illicit drug traffic control, and free transit of cargo.383 The maritime 
question outlined in Point 6 was considered an issue that required stronger bilateral talks; 
unfortunately, at the time of the leaders’ planned meeting in November 2010, Chile 
unilaterally postponed the talk indefinitely.384 Since bilateral dialogue suspended in 
2010, Bolivia took the issue to The Hague.385   
a. Key Outcomes of Negotiations 
In this phase, the negotiating period was scarce in discussion, as the fallout 
seemed to transform into a one-sided matter after the postponement. The maritime issue 
included in the 13 Points was the only point not addressed in their political dialogue. 
President Morales noted in 2012 that only some progress had been made in the other 12 
points, but none had defining results.386 The “unwillingness of the [Chilean] 
administration” compelled Bolivia to push for international assistance.387   
b. Application of Hypotheses 
Shortly after the 13 Point Agenda talks were put on hold, Bolivia claimed Chile 
had offered the landlocked state a maritime enclave—without sovereignty—to satisfy 
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their necessity for sea access.388 Morales expressed the need for results, since Bolivia 
cannot “settle for ‘encouraging’ statements.”389 In this attempt, Chile did not offer 
something equating to the challenger’s idea of results, yet it demonstrated the maritime 
power’s perception that this version of territorial concession could be an alternative. 
Chile’s suggestion for a non-sovereign maritime enclave for Bolivia did not threaten its 
status quo; therefore, given the unsuccessful outcome of the negotiations, the realist 
hypothesis does not explain the absence of a resolution. 
Morales met with Bachelet with the hopes of developing mutual trust between the 
nations and strengthening the relationship—the first point on the 13 Point Agenda.390 
Both presidents saw the essential importance of this when building this working agenda; 
however, the attempts came to a standstill after Chile stopped coming to the table on the 
issue. Given these cooperative intentions, HL1 cannot explain this outcome. 
The results of this period’s outcome arrived without use of an international 
resolution body, but fueled the fire that eventually compelled Morales’ administration to 
seek a solution elsewhere. In addition, the heads of government formulated the policy 
without the use of considerably influencing discourse to do so among their constituents. 
Provided those reasons, both the constructivist and the second liberal approaches can be 
ruled out.  
In all, our hypotheses do not play a role in an outcome that essentially fell short 
(see Table 14). This example demonstrates that once diplomatic relations diminish, the 
challenger state will begin to exercise its other options if the issue is salient enough. With 
Peru, this outward-looking venture was successful in the case of the International Court. 
For Bolivia, their search for a sovereign path to the sea proved luckless many times under 
bilateral discussions with Chile. Morales once declared that the Bolivian struggle “must 
henceforward include another fundamental element, namely our recourse to international 
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tribunals and bodies, claiming a free and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, in law 
and in justice.”391 
Table 14.   Hypotheses Application to the 13 Puntos 
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7. 2013 Application to the International Court of Justice 
On March 23, 2011, the Bolivian anniversary of the Día del Mar (Day of the Sea), 
President Evo Morales took the platform to address the Bolivian people about the new 
direction, emphasizing international law and its success in attending to appeals regarding 
disputes.392 After Chile declined to respond with a way ahead to solve Bolivia’s maritime 
issue other than the statement, “Bolivia lacks any legal basis to access the Pacific Ocean 
through territories appertaining to Chile,” Morales announced the decision to appeal to 
the International Court of Justice.393 The application was filed on April 23, 2013, arguing 
that Chile had not followed through on its declarations to negotiate Bolivian sovereign 
access.394 Because of Chile’s inaction, Bolivia requested that the Court adjudge that 
Chile had breached its obligation to negotiate and, therefore, must promptly comply with 
its obligation to negotiate fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.395 To clarify, this 
is independent of the 1904 Treaty; Bolivia does not ask the Court to make a 
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determination of its right to sovereign access—although access is, indeed, Bolivia’s 
aim—but to determine whether Chile has an obligation to negotiate (see Figure 13).396  
The ICJ conferred with Bolivian and Chilean representatives to affix time limits 
on filing pleadings, as well as order of procedure;397 primarily, this measure would 
compel Chile to act or respond within a reasonable time frame. Since 2013, Bolivia and 
Chile have presented statements and counter-statements that invoke the 1904 Peace 
Treaty and 1948 Pact of Bogotá, and if they are relevant to the dispute at hand.398 The 
last known conclusion by the ICJ was in September 2015, a rejection of Chile’s 
preliminary objection of whether the ICJ had jurisdiction in September 2015. 
 
Figure 13.  Map Showing Former Territories of Bolivia and Peru before 
the War of the Pacific399 
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a. Application of Hypotheses: Projection of Outcome 
As with the 2008 situation with Peru, Chile’s position was a result of years of 
failed attempts. Faced with a challenge that saw no end in sight, and wanting to do 
something about it within his lifetime, President Morales’s vision was to grant his 
deserving homeland to full sovereign access. To Bolivia’s favor, the ICJ claimed 
jurisdiction of the dispute case;400 to Bolivia’s detriment, the decision of the international 
institution is constrained to the analysis of a historical obligation—not to designate an 
actual corridor for the landlocked state. The manner in which the international body is 
used cannot contribute to a determinate resolution. In any case, it is still possible to 
deduce, through IR analysis and from past territorial disputes with Chile, what factors 
might increase the likelihood of a resolution. 
The realist approach suggests that Chile would be less likely to come to the 
negotiating table if it perceives that conceding territory threatens its power status. In the 
past, Chile rejected Peru’s proposal for a joint zone with shared sovereignty. To some 
degree, that indicates that Chile regards loss of that highly contested land (and resource 
rich land) to be costly to its economy and national pride. To ensure a truly bilateral 
concession—that is, exclusion of Peru in the matter—Chile has to part with its own 
territory. Chile and Bolivia have participated in multiple fruitless negotiations—or rather, 
plans to negotiate—offering less and less opportunity for the matter to terminate. The last 
ICJ summary of judgment was indicative of Chile’s conviction in the trial, which is that 
“Chile has no obligation to negotiate access to the sea.”401 Bachelet reinforced this belief 
many times, backing her country’s “unyielding defense of . . . territorial integrity and 
national defense.”402 
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The first liberal approach argues that if both states perceive that maintaining the 
status of democratic peace and mutual cooperation is more beneficial, both would come 
to a resolution. In the 2013 Application to the ICJ, President Morales’ requested for a 
resolution regarding the maritime and territorial problem through peaceful means.403 He 
has also directed the ICJ to the Pact of Bogotá—of which both are member parties. The 
accord renders “obligatory peaceful settlement itself,” and with Chile and Bolivia 
subscribed to its purpose (and made publicly known to the ICJ at this time), both 
demonstrate an inclination to resolve peacefully.404 However, since the 2013 lawsuit, 
Chile had expressed thoughts of withdrawing from the Pact, causing the legal aspect of 
desired peace to be negated.405  
The presence of an international institution, which constitutes the second liberal 
argument, is utilized here in this resolution attempt. The length of time in which the ICJ 
takes to determine a case varies, but since the initial application, Bolivia has filed an 
application and Memorial in submission to the court; Chile has since filed a preliminary 
objection against whether the Court had jurisdiction.406 Bolivia’s respects the outcome of 
the 1904 treaty regarding land concession; thus, Morales argues that there is evidence of 
Chile declaring a responsibility to arrange for sea access.407 If the ICJ does grant the 
outcome favoring Bolivia’s request, their ruling conveys that Bolivia has a right to an 
expectation—and in the end may not result in attaining their ultimate aim. Though the 
outcome of the international resolution body may prolong the dream toward access, it 
could lead to other negative consequences with respect to Chile’s international reputation. 
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The constructivist hypothesis states that if it is within the agenda of leadership to 
promote discourse in favor resolution, it is more likely to occur. As evidenced in this 
chapter, Bolivia is historically the main advocate of this dispute—and rightfully so. In the 
1970s and with the recent 13 Points, there appeared to be an enthusiasm from the target 
state, which shows that political leadership and the type of discourse they advocate can 
be significant. Morales, who has championed Bolivia’s quest for the sea multiple times 
and made it a main part of his platform, issued his address for international action their 
nationally symbolic Día del Mar (Day of the Sea), a parade commemorating the loss of 
territory to Chile in 1883. In addition, his administration had commissioned more than 30 
artists to sing Las Playas del Futuro (Beaches of the Future) to perform at The Hague in 
order to regain international support.
408
 Unfortunately, if Bolivia desires these beaches, 
Chilean leadership has to provide the same rhetoric if and when the ICJ determines 
negotiation is required. 
D. ANALYSIS OF RESOLUTIONS AND CONCLUSION  
1. Observations 
Chile has shown—through its past disputes with Argentina and Peru—that it can 
attain resolutions if mutual peace, political discourse, and the use of an international 
resolution body are in play. This chapter’s final resolution attempt demonstrates the 
presence of these three; however, the “question” of the dispute moves away from 
attaining territory and toward a more abstract idea—an expectation. Because these 
democratic states respect the sanctity of the 1904 Treaty, which cannot be reversed, 
Bolivia proceeded with a different to obtain its objective. Aside from national pride, 
Bolivia has made it clear through a century of undertakings that this will remain a 
constant mission for the Bolivia people because of its effect on a declining economy.  
In all of the cases that resulted in resolution, HL1 was present (see Table 15). The 
last successful attempt occurred at the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, where the 
Chile gained valuable lands from Peru and Bolivia as a result of the War of the Pacific. 
                                                 
408 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Landlocked Bolivia’s Symbolic Step Seaward,” Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs, November 5, 2010, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.coha.org/landlocked-
bolivia’s-symbolic-step-seaward/. 
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After this outcome, peaceful diplomatic relations begin to drop, which is also evident in 
subsequent resolution attempts. Also, the previous dyads featuring Argentina and Peru 
concluded with political leaders promoting discourse in favor of settlement, which the 
Charaña Embrace and 13 Puntos failed to do. The ICJ ruling does feature the 
constructivist argument, but it misses the mutual cooperation aspect and falls through in 
addressing the key subject of land allocation to Bolivia. If Chile does receive the ruling to 
negotiate terms with Bolivia, it is likely for Bolivia to win if its future head of 
government pushing for an absolute solution with its neighbor, while simultaneous 
striving to do so through peaceful means. 
Table 15.   How Each Hypothesis Explains the Attempt at Resolution 
for the Chile–Bolivia Dyad 























Yes Yes No No 4 
1874 Treaty of 
Limits 
Yes Yes No No 4 
1904 Treaty of 
Peace and 
Friendship 
No Yes Yes No 4 
1975 Charaña 
Embrace 
Yes Yes No No 1 
2006-10 13 
Puntos 
No No No No 1 
2013 ICJ 
Ruling 
Yes No Yes Yes Pending 
 
2. Why Does Bolivia Want Access to the Sea So Badly? 
Although Bolivia is resource-rich with its growth attributed to the markets for gas 
exports, it still remains one of the least developed countries in South America. As of 
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September 2015, Bolivia ranks 158th out of 230 countries on the World Factbook list for 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and is the poorest in South America.409 Bolivia 
attributes its current condition largely on the fact that it is landlocked.410 Without access 
to oceans, the ease of transporting goods to and from ports is severely limited, and 
ultimately hinders trade and economic growth. There remains a tendency for enterprises 
to view landlocked states as unreliable in trade, since their role as a “transit country” can 
interrupt the flow of commerce.411 As a transit country, Bolivia is susceptible to 
disruptions of imported goods; border officials often extract bribes from drivers and 
cause delays that keep the landlocked entity moving at a lower rate of progress than 
coastal states.412  
On a wider scale, ideas and people typically flow much faster in maritime 
countries than those that are landlocked; these types of opportunity costs often bypass 
countries like Bolivia. With direct access to the sea, its prospects for economic 
development would improve; Bolivia shares this characteristic with other landlocked 
countries.413 Also, they generally have weaker institutions, which have been linked to 
weaker GDP.414 With a few exceptions (a prime example is Switzerland, which 
specializes in finance), the world’s landlocked countries are considered to be generally 
poor. Compared to their maritime neighbors, the overall GDP of countries without a 
coastline is 40 percent lower.415  
Despite Bolivia’s obsession with the coast, there have been other numerous 
changes to the country’s borders that have brought disadvantage to the country. Since its 
independence in 1825, Bolivia’s territory has changed hands to all of its neighboring 
countries. In 1903, Bolivia sold the region of Acre, to Brazil in turn for monetary 
                                                 
409 World Factbook, s.v., “Bolivia.” 
410 “Beaches of the Future?” 
411 “Interiors: Why It’s Better to Have a Coastline,” The Economist, May 9, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21650574-why-its-better-have-coastline-interiors. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Dominguez et al., “Boundary Disputes,” 19. 
414 “Interiors.” 
415 “Beaches of the Future?” 
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compensation as a result of the Treaty of Petropolis.416 To follow Mackinder’s theory, 
Brazil viewed the Mato Grosso-Paraguay-Bolivia area as a “heartland” that must be 
controlled by Brazil in order to fulfill its predestined “continental role.”417 Brazil fulfilled 
that by cutting off its northern territory, as well as its eastern portion in Mato Grosso. In 
the 1930s, Bolivia and Paraguay (both landlocked countries) fought over disputed 
territory; the Gran Chaco, which was thought to have oil reserves at that time. Despite 
being more advantaged in the war, Bolivia lost approximately two-thirds of the disputed 
territory to Paraguay.418   
Bolivia’s dismemberment was due to its ability to control its territory before 
aggressors.419 Although these boundary changes were all resolved by mutual agreement, 
the loss of land has continued to fuel frustration with Chile, who remains indifferent. The 
frustrating Bolivian relationship with Chile represents not only the issue of sovereignty 
and territorial conflict, but of one of the few cases of irredentism in the Western 
Hemisphere.420   
3. Compliance to the Ruling 
The Chile-Bolivia dyad demonstrates an inability to reach settlement through 
bilateral means. Up until 2013, the protracted dispute had not actually been presented to 
an international resolution body, which changes a variable in Bolivia’s century-long 
endeavor for its path to the sea. Peru and Argentina found settlement through an 
underlying mutual desire for peace; at this time, diplomatic relations between Chile and 
Bolivia lack the strength deemed essential for a resolution. The question still exists, 
though—will Chile and Bolivia comply with the ruling? In Latin America, there is 
already a normative framework that induces dyads to comply to international arbitration 
                                                 
416 American Geographic Society, “The New Boundary between Bolivia and Peru,” Bulletin of the 
American Geographical Society 42, no. 6 (1910), 435, http://www.jstor.org/stable/199363. 
417 John Child, “Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America,” Latin America Research Review 14, no. 2 
(1979), 91. 
418 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v., “Chaco War,” accessed September 9, 2015, 
http://www.britannica.com/event/Chaco-War. 
419 Child, “Geopolitical Thinking,” 105. 
420 Manero, “Strategic Representations,” 11. 
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(Argentina’s rejection in 1977 is an outlier) because the acceptance enhances state 
reputations.421 If the ICJ rules in favor of Bolivia, I argue that Chile will comply for its 
own state self-preservation. Unfortunately, this does not solve the issue and the dispute 
may continue to endure. If the ICJ rules in favor if Chile, Bolivia may have to explore 
other options, or cope with its misfortune.   
I postulate that with a more directed question and the presence of the liberal and 
constructivist approaches above, both states may come to a solution that satisfies the 
dyad. The less directed question concerning obligations and expectations in conjunction 
with all approaches noted above is less likely to result in a terminal resolution.   
  
                                                 
421 Arie M. Kacowicz, The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience 
1881–2001 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 76. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As Latin American countries have celebrated their 200th year of independence, 
and while others approach that milestone in a few short years, there are still many long-
lasting disputes that cover the region. The dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia has 
continued to manifest from territorial to maritime boundary dispute, similar to both 
controversies involving Argentina and Peru. The case is currently under the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ, giving credence to the relevance and importance of this research. 
The purpose of Chapter VI is to provide an overview of the case studies discussed 
throughout this thesis, while discussing speculations of the dyadic analyses regarding 
dispute resolution. First, this chapter reviews the three dyads presented via an 
international relations scan, which provide a more streamline approach. Next, the 
findings indicate links across the chapters that help understand what factors are likely to 
bring states in territorial or border conflict to settlement. Knowledge of what theoretical 
tools attain resolution can be valuable in recognizing when a dispute likely ends. Finally, 
this chapter addresses possible areas for further development and research within the 
Latin American domain. 
As a review, I examined three Latin American dyads that engaged in a territorial 
or border conflict. All case studies included Chile as the common link yet exhibited 
variation by country and by resolution outcome.   
A. CASE STUDY SUMMARY 
Chapter III discussed the territorial dispute with Chile and Argentina regarding 
the Beagle Channel, which, after a century of various treaties and agreements, resulted in 
an enduring resolution in the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. After years of 
disputing the islands, one variation changed from 1977 to 1984, where both states were 
influenced by a modification of an international mediator—the Vatican presence. 
Throughout all of the dyadic sub cases, HR1 and HL1 remained a constant presence in all 
outcomes. The varied constructivist and second liberal arguments varied in the sub cases 
with full resolutions, but both had not been present at the same time until the final 
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outcome in 1984, which has not been challenged since. From the rejection of the Arbitral 
Award in 1977 to the 1984 Peace Treaty, my research shows that both liberal arguments 
and the constructivist argument were present in the final outcome, rejecting this thesis’s 
realist hypothesis. This chapter established that for this particular Chilean dyad, the 
combination of a desired mutual peace, presence of an international resolution body, and 
accompaniment of leaders that promote favorable discourse toward settlement are likely 
to terminate this type of conflict.  
In Chapter IV, I investigated Peru’s unilateral act concerning the maritime 
boundary with Chile. The issue had not been a major point of conflict until the mid-
1980s, and even so, had not been administratively addressed between governments. 
Rather than spanning the period of a century, the case concluded in a matter of a few 
decades, and in the same manner as the Chile-Argentina dyad. The maritime boundary 
dispute functioned as its own sub case, with the constructivist and both liberal arguments 
playing factors in the outcome as in the previous dyad. Consistent with the constructivist 
approach highlighting the significance of political leadership, the resolution persisted 
after the fact. The parties committed to comply with the ICJ verdict, which fell short of 
the leverage argument.   
Chapter V explored Bolivia’s pursuit of sovereign access to the sea that 
demonstrated the turn of diplomatic relations at the point of war. Because of Bolivia’s 
landlocked condition, access to the sea has become a salient mission in government 
policy. Through numerous attempts to attain a corridor to maritime access, Chile has not 
fully given in to the challenger’s demands. Unlike interstate relations with Argentina and 
Peru, the outcomes of the various agreements are characterized by two phases of its 
history: pre- and post-War of the Pacific. The sub cases demonstrate that the realist 
argument and the lack of any constructivist strategy explain the failure for these 
resolution attempts. Due to the intrinsic power these states place in treaties, the 1904 
cession of territory makes it complicated to manipulate. The current case in the ICJ was 
submitted under the premise of political discourse and the use of an international 
mediator; however, the attempt fails to mimic the pattern of Chile’s previous disputes. 
Additionally, because of the binding treaty in 1904, the dispute question is Bolivia’s 
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alternative to the actual illness of its government, which is the constant necessity for 
coastal territory to call its own. 
B. FINDINGS 
This thesis presents three case studies that cover three broad categories of 
geopolitical disputes—territorial, maritime, and irredentist. Over the first two chapters, 
the research discards the realist argument, which asserts that target states that perceive no 
threat to their status will. The argument failed in these cases because Chile was willing to 
tip the scale and focus more attention on peacemaking with Argentina and Peru, perhaps 
because of what a reciprocal alliance might produce for the nation. These cases 
demonstrate that one can desire peace, but simultaneously cannot risk concession—and 
vice versa. Only one argument (either HR1 or HL1) can be present, for they nearly 
contradict themselves in the pursuit of a resolution. For Chile to negotiate, the country 
must believe it will not lose any valuable interests that may significantly impact its status 
quo. At the same time, both governments must foster a relationship based on cooperation; 
this in turn establishes the inter-related constructivist argument. In Bolivia’s case, it 
appears that Chilean leaders refrain from re-establishing relations, because at this time, 
the situation neither adds nor detracts from its current state of affairs in South America. 
In both Argentina and Peru’s case, the constructivist and liberal arguments were 
all present in its final outcome (see Table 16). Notably, each party within each dyad 
conceded something of interest with the employment of the external resolution body—
thus, increasing its stake in their respective territorial or border question. Particularly, 
Chile lost full dominion over the island group and settled on a decision that was aided by 
papal influence of peace, friendship, and a common faith. The ICJ judgment erased 
Peruvian doubt regarding the questionable existence of the maritime boundary but was 
additionally accommodated by Chilean leadership, who saw the opportunity for the ruling 
to put aside emotions reeled from the war more than a century ago. Traditionally, Latin 
American states have used external parties for arbitration; they generally perceive that by 
acceptance of these arbitral awards, the reciprocity principle is strengthened.422  The 
                                                 
422 Kacowicz, Impact of Norms, 76. 
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desire for reciprocity is often related to something they want in return, such as resources, 
regional security, or formal alliances. Bolivia’s use of the ICJ is aligns with the use in the 
other two dyads, but it alone will not be enough. For Chile to accept a third party, as it 
had in the past, it needs to perceive that something on the other side is there. As natural 
resources deplete from the region, there is bound to be that something; however, that 
cannot be measured with time, and time is not on Bolivia’s side.  
As mentioned, the constructivist argument derives from the desire for states to 
mutually cooperate. For Latin American states, political discourse can turn 
rapprochement into strong alliances, and from friends to foes. Nationalism can play a 
huge role in disputes resolution, as it does with Chile and Bolivia. Bolivians are 
accustomed to the anti-Chilean sentiment, while Chileans are imbued with the concept 
that the land is rightfully theirs to possess. De-justification, as in Kornprobst’s argument,  
of these attitudes on nationalism and borders will give way to cordial relations, eventually 
influencing the use of the liberal approaches.423   
Table 16.   Summary of Findings from Case Studies 
























No Yes Yes Yes 4 
ICJ Ruling 
(Bolivia) 
Yes No Yes Yes Pending 
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1. Bolivia–Chile in Speculation 
Since the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the dispute has been fueled by 
economic hardship and sentiments of nationalism, making it one of the longest territorial 
disputes in South America. I speculate that Bolivia’s issue can be resolved with the 
support of the target state, which must de-legitimize, or de-justify the importance of the 
territory. This also must be done under the foundation of a willingness for democratic 
peace, which proves to be a significant part of the resolution process. The combination of 
the liberal and constructivist theories have been reinforced in the two case studies as 
altogether necessary for dispute resolution. Rapprochement may be present throughout 
these dyads, but the dominance of the element of reciprocity must outweigh the other 
factors to be all the more considered.  
Chile’s current status suggests that the country has reaped the benefits from these 
dispute resolutions, because today they are prosperous and globally competitive. Chile’s 
high rankings on multiple indices (world-ranked #7 on Economic Freedom Index and #1 
within the South American region,424 #42 on the Human Development Index,425 and 
#150 out of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index426) correlate with its successes from 
this Award and many others. Even so, the Beagle Channel conflict demonstrated that 
Chile had refrained from exhibiting an overpowering desire to gain territorial advantage 
within the Southern Cone.   
By examining the Southern Cone’s current situation, one can see that a “virtuous 
circle” is in play: when countries are able to resolve disputes, trade increases. This likely 
increases the incentive to continue compliance, which decreases the prospect a state will 
                                                 
424 Terry Miller and Anthony B. Kim, “Economic Freedom in America: A Supplement to the 2016 
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425 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human 
Development (New York: UNDP, 2015), accessed February 12, 2016, 
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 108 
reach the point of military conflict—hence, lead to progress and integration.427  Schultz 
cites evidence of this type of successful integration in Europe, arguing, “Borders that 
used to be fought over are now largely meaningless from the perspective of economic 
flows.”428 For example, he insists that in Croatia’s case, the incentive to join the 
European Union was to propel the push to resolve its outstanding disputes with Slovenia. 
The liberal theory application means that economic integration and the apparent benefits 
are highly probable stimulants for dispute resolution.429 Arguably, due to the rate of 
Chilean consumption of natural gas and the amounts that Bolivia contains, a resolution is 
probable in the future for Bolivian beaches.430 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Territorial disputes have been a mainstay in international relations since the 
formation of states. In view of the limited scope of this thesis, there are possible areas for 
future research that could enrich the understanding of what factors bring states to the 
negotiating table. Research of alternative data sets may include investigating other 
schools of international relations theory, such as English School and neologisms of 
current traditional approaches. Another approach in narrowing the theories on disputes in 
Latin America is to conduct more case studies like this replacing Chile as the nexus 
model. Additionally, a deeper dive into the traditional IR schools may be analyzed using 
empirical data and other controls, such as Chile. Dividing the hypotheses examined in 
this thesis into more detailed studies only add to the literature of dispute resolution, 
especially to Latin American academia.  
As the use of conventional warfare rapidly subsides, more and more conflicts turn 
to diplomatic means of settlement. Moreover, there is still so much more work to be done 
in shaping the field of research in Latin America, especially as more Latin American 
countries appear to value international institutions. Dr. Rodrigo Nieto Gómez, professor 
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of Geopolitics at Naval Postgraduate School, stated, “Borders are often conflicts frozen in 
time; they are geopolitical constructs that materialize in territories of linear configuration 
and are inscribed in space.”431 By gaining understanding of what certain territories and 
borders actually represent to nations can help policy-makers and scholars formulate 
strategies and contribute to the wide repertoire of diplomatic relations. 
 
  
                                                 
431 Rodrigo Nieto Gómez, “Introduction to Comparative Border Security” (lecture, Comparative 
Border Security, Naval Postgraduate School, July 27, 2015). 
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